

SECURITY GRADING

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20 MAR 1970

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Mr Hinchcliffe

Iraq

## Two nations in one state

If the Kurdish peace sticks—and at least it looks more like doing so than the previous attempts at a settlement—it will make Iraq's constitution unique in the Middle East. Iraq will be virtually two nations, Arab and Kurd. But the Moslem faith links the two peoples of different language and race. And, as Sunni Moslems, the Kurds will bolster the Baathists' Sunni leadership, reasserting a Sunni majority over those Arabs who are Shii Moslems.

The Kurds—some 1.5 million people out of Iraq's total population of 9 million—will have administrative autonomy in all areas where they predominate; but Baghdad will deal with such matters as oil and development. Thus it should not be beyond human wit to apportion responsibility at Kirkuk, Iraq's major oilfield, should the Kurds prove their claim to outnumber other people living there. At present they do not do so, since so many Kurds were driven out of the district during their nine years in revolt. Nor has it ever been established that they did, in the past, outnumber the local Arabs and Assyrians. But the Kurds are to be repatriated before a census is taken.

The Kurds have won a great victory in obtaining their right to autonomy and also—by, reportedly, a secret treaty—to retain their own militia. What is openly

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accepted is that their heavy arms and their radio station are not to be handed over until all 12 clauses of their agreement with Baghdad are in force. Their leader, Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who has warmly welcomed the agreement, needs to keep his military apparatus intact both as a guarantee for the settlement and to carry his soldiers with him along the unfamiliar road to peace.

It may still be a road full of obstacles. The test of an enduring settlement may well be in the Baghdad government's ability to associate Kurds in practice as well as theory in all policy-making decisions. Only so can the two nations coalesce. There remains the more distant question of whether the project, if successful, will give ideas to the other 5 million Kurds, in Turkey, Syria and Iran. In Syria they appear to be assimilated and in Turkey, where they are known as "Mountain Turks," have caused no concern for many years. But the Iranian Kurds have been helping their brothers in revolt in Iraq and some have bitter-sweet memories of their own brief period of Russian-aided autonomy in 1946.

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**Kurdish New Year meeting in Sulaymaniyah** The Assistant Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Regional Command, Saddam Husayn and the Kurdish Democratic Party Political Bureau member Dr. Mahmud Ali Uthman on 21st March attended a festival in Sulaymaniyah on the occasion of the New Year. The Governor of Sulaymaniyah made a speech stressing the importance of uniting to expel the Zionists from the Holy Land of Palestine. Barzani's representative, Shafiq Ahmad, then made a speech calling for the strengthening of national unity and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood to combat the intriguers and divisionists, the servants of international imperialism. Speeches were also made on behalf of the Arab Ba'th Party and the delegations of Iraqi jurists and the Kurdish organisations. (Baghdad in Arabic 15.00 GMT 21.3.70)

**Kurdish relations with communists** Kurdish Democratic Party Secretary Dr. Mahmud Uthman has stressed that the peaceful solution will increase prospects of co-operation with the Iraqi Communist Party. He expressed the hope that talks with various parties and national forces would form the nucleus of the anticipated front (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.10 GMT 22.3.70). The Iraqi Communist Party Central Command Secretary Aziz al-Hajj has sent a cable to the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party National and Regional Commands praising the agreement on the Kurdish question. The Central Command is a splinter group which broke away from the Communist Party after the June 1967 war (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.15 GMT 22.3.70).

**Kurdish visitors to Hillah** The Ba'th Party Regional Command member Salah Umar al-Ali, the Kurdish Democratic Party Political Bureau member Muhammad Mahmud Abd ar-Rahman and Idris Mustafa Barzani arrived in Hillah on 23rd March. A mass rally was later held near the Hillah Governorate building and the visitors attended a banquet given by the Governor of Hillah Khalis al-Aballi. Ali and his party returned to Baghdad the same day. (Baghdad in Arabic 17.00 GMT 23.3.70)

**Bulgarian delegation in Syria** A Bulgarian delegation led by the Chairman of the Bulgarian Friendship Committee for Cultural Relations arrived in Damascus on 22nd March on a one-week visit to Syria. (Damascus in Arabic 05.15 GMT 23.3.70)

**Prisoners in Saudi Arabia** (Excerpt) Damascus: The Arabian Peninsula People's Union has received three handwritten letters from prisoners explaining the terror and savage treatment the honest prisoners are suffering under the autocratic Saudi regime. These letters denounced the US Intelligence's role in the Arabian Peninsula and the savage and immoral actions against the detainees and prisoners and their families. The letters also gave the names of Saudi reactionaries dealing with the US Intelligence and described their formation of committees for torture and terrorism... (Syrian Arab News Agency in Arabic 13.45 GMT 23.3.70)

**King Husayn's message to King Hasan** Crown Prince Hasan left Amman for Rabat on 23rd March with a message from King Husayn to King Hasan. (Amman in Arabic 08.00 GMT 23.3.70)

**Hasan Abbas Zaki's arrival in Kuwait** On 23rd March the UAR Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Hasan Abbas Zaki arrived in Kuwait on a four-day official visit accompanied by a three-man delegation. (Kuwait in Arabic 17.00 GMT 23.3.70)

**Kuwaiti office in Bahrain** A Kuwaiti Government office will be opened in Bahrain to pave the way for an exchange of diplomatic representation at embassy level upon completion of the scheduled withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf in 1971. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 11.50 GMT 23.3.70)

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**Asifah operations** (Abstract of Palestine Armed Struggle Command statements) Asifah attacked an enemy patrol in the Zawr Abdullah area and killed its members. Asifah Group 611 attacked a vehicle park and barracks in the Sirhanah area in the Golan Heights with rockets and other weapons. The enemy suffered heavy casualties. Asifah Group 557 attacked a vehicle park and troop centre in the Tall as-Sindiayah area in the Golan Heights with heavy rockets. A number of vehicles were destroyed. ("Voice of Fatah" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 23.3.70)

**"Voice of Fatah" programme 23rd March** The "Voice of Fatah" programme in Arabic (18.30 GMT) on 23rd March urged Hebron workers to refuse employment by "the enemy"; praised Chinese support for the "Arab revolution"; warned against Israeli plans to make Jerusalem a Jewish city by opening youth clubs and places of entertainment to divert young Arabs from the path of revolution; and welcomed the expression of support for the Palestinian fight for Arab rights by the Khartoum conference of Arab intellectuals.

#### Arab Radio Comment 23.3.70

**ALGERIA** 20.00 GMT: The attempted coup in the Congo (Brazzaville).

**IRAQ** 19.00 GMT: Intrigues by US Intelligence.

**JORDAN** 19.00 GMT: Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

**LIBYA** 13.00 GMT: Importance of the Libyan revolution.

**SYRIA** 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): The Karamah anniversary.

**TUNISIA** 12.00 GMT: Progress in Tunisia on the occasion of the independence anniversary.

**UAR** 12.30 GMT: Sami Hasan Sirri on US aid to Israel. 18.30 GMT ("We and the World"): (i) Rogers's statement on the aircraft decision; (ii) contradictions in Israeli official statements.

**"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo)** 11.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on US aid to Israel. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine service"): Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on the increase in Palestinian resistance. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): Israeli propaganda lies. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): Ismat Ibrahim on the Arab oil conference recommendations. 18.00 GMT: Sa'd Ghazal on Rogers's statement on the question of aircraft for Israel (see above).

#### Reports in Brief

**Muhammad Ali Haytham's tour** The Southern Yemeni delegation, led by Muhammad Ali Haytham, the Premier, concluded his official visit to Libya on 23rd March and left for Cairo (Libyan News Agency in Arabic 10.30 GMT 23.3.70). President Nasir received Muhammad Ali Haytham and his delegation on 23rd March (Cairo in Arabic 20.00 GMT 23.3.70).

**Baghdad 'Ath-Thawrah' on communist participation as fida'iyyin** (Text) Baghdad: speaking of the new fida'i organisation Ansar, 'Ath-Thawrah' says: The decision by certain Arab communist parties to participate in fida'i action is in response to the mature attitude of the Arab Left in completely rejecting the Zionist presence and all its illegitimate offspring. This is a good decision and we hope the rest of the Arab communist parties will follow suit, because this is the correct basis to build an Arab communist movement capable of understanding thoroughly and interacting with the concepts of the Arab revolution. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.35 GMT 23.3.70)



**SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT):** Visit by the Arab Socialist Union delegation to consolidate unity.

**UAR 12.30 GMT:** Abd al-Fattah Hilal on failure of US campaign to deceive Arab public over its relations with Israel. 18.30 GMT ('We and the World'): (i) US strategy in Middle and Far East of creating local conflicts; (ii) Eban's interview in 'Jewish Chronicle' of 27th March on the US statement on the Phantom aircraft.

**'Voice of the Arabs' (Cairo) 11.30 GMT:** Salah as Suwayfi on US economic and political support for Israel. 14.15 GMT ('Palestine Service'): Increasing strength of Palestine Resistance. 15.15 GMT ('People in Sinai'): Review of the Prophet's struggle against non-believers. 16.20 GMT ('Conversation with a Listener'): Need for Arab information media to praise Arab steadfastness. 17.00 GMT ('Arabian Peninsula'): Mubarak Ahmad Mubarak on recent visit to Somalia by UAR Minister of National Guidance. 18.00 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on US and Israeli efforts to obtain a cease-fire.

**'Maghrib Service' (Cairo) 21.30 GMT:** Adil Antar on US support for Israel in calling for a cease-fire and arms supply limitation.

#### Reports in Brief


**Soviet naval delegation's visit to Syria** (Text) The Chief of State and Premier. Dr. Nur ad-Din Al-Atasi, received Admiral Sysoyev, Commander of the Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea, at 19.00 today. The admiral was accompanied by a number of Soviet naval officers. The meeting was attended by the Soviet Ambassador in Damascus, Nureddin Mukhitdinov. The Defence Minister, Air-Marshal Hafiz al-Asad, had received the Soviet delegation at 18.00 today. This meeting was attended by the Syrian Chief of Staff and First Deputy Defence Minister, Maj-Gen. Mustafa Talas, the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet Military Attache. (Damascus in Arabic 19.15 GMT 27.3.70)

**Bakr's visit to Baghdad airport** President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr on 25th March inspected a Soviet IL-62 aircraft at Baghdad international airport. (Baghdad in Arabic 15.00 GMT 25.3.70)

**Ban on arms for Kurds** The Kurdish Democratic Party has issued a statement banning Peshmarga in the northern region from carrying arms. (Baghdad in Arabic 05.00 GMT 25.3.70)

**Kurdish visit to Diyala** Taha al-Jazrawi, member of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party Regional Command, and a delegation of the Kurdish Democratic Party including Nuri Shawish and Nafiz Jalal, on 27th March visited Diyala Province. Speaking at a rally there, Jazrawi said that the democratic settlement of the Kurdish question was not a reconciliation between two nationalities but an agreement involving all elements of the Iraqi people. He added that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party would hold seminars in various parts of the country as an expression of their solidarity. (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 27.3.70)

**Situation in N Iraq** The Ministry of the Interior has finished preparing a Pensions' Bill for the families of people killed in the incidents in the North. A large number of irregular forces in the northern region have been released, and administrative changes in the region have taken place to implement the 11th March statement. A population census will take place in the northern provinces in the autumn. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.35 GMT 27.3.70)



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Arab Radio Comment 25. 3. 70

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: Israeli defiance of international law.

LIBYA 13.00 GMT: The nature of neo-imperialism.

SAUDI ARABIA 18.00 GMT: Zionist barbarism in Palestine.

SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): US financial aid to Israel.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah Hilal on US aid to Israel. 18.30 GMT ('We and the World'): Ambiguity of statement by William Rogers.

'Voice of the Arabs' (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on US aid for Israel. 14.15 GMT ('Palestine Service'): Samir Abd al-Tawwab on the PLO's memorandum to the Jiddah conference. 15.15 GMT ('People in Sinai'): Israeli efforts to remove the inhabitants of Sinai. 16.20 GMT ('Conversation with a Listener'): US technical aid to Israel. 17.00 GMT ('Arabian Peninsula'): Sayyid Uways on US support for Israel. 18.00 GMT: Hilmi al-Buluk on US aid to Israel.

'Maghrib Service' (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: The Libyan Foreign Minister's speech at the Jiddah conference.

Arab Radio Comment 26. 3. 70

IRAQ 19.00 GMT: The need for Arab unity to stop civil war in Lebanon.

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: Rifa'i's speech at the Jiddah conference.

LEBANON 18.00 GMT: Appeal for respect for agreements and avoidance of dissension (see above).

SAUDI ARABIA 18.00 GMT: The Jiddah conference communique.

SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): Developments in Lebanon.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Muhammad Sharaf on Nasir's statement to the National Assembly. 18.30 GMT ('Spotlight on World Problems'): (i) US aid to Israel; (ii) Nasir's statement to the National Assembly.

'Voice of the Arabs' (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on Nasir's statement to the National Assembly. 14.15 GMT ('Palestine Service'): Ali Musa on Israeli plans to drive the Arabs out of the occupied territory. 16.20 GMT ('Conversation with a Listener'): UAR determination to defend the homeland. 17.00 GMT ('Arabian Peninsula'): Nasir's statement to the National Assembly. 18.00 GMT: Hilmi al-Buluk on US aid to Israel.

'Maghrib Service' (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: Adil Antar on the Libyan occupation of the British base at Tobruk.

Arab Radio Comment 27. 3. 70

JORDAN 19.00 GMT ('The World in a Week'): Middle East developments and the US-Soviet struggle for influence in the area, the Rogers-Dobrynin talks as a means of cutting down Soviet aid to Arabs and ensuring Israeli superiority, and France's role in international affairs.

LIBYA 13.00 GMT: Arab unity and socialism.

MOROCCO 20.30 GMT: Zionist crimes and violation of Islamic holy places.



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REGISTRY No. 10

31 MAR 1970

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B26 KURDISH BAN ON CARRYING ARMS

*Kurd Al!*

*Mr. Hirschhoff*  
*MM 26/3*

(IRAQI NEWS AGENCY) IRBIL: THE KURDISTANI DEMOCRATIC PARTY LAST NIGHT ISSUED A STATEMENT LAST NIGHT FORBIDDING PESHMERGAS (CED. KURDISH SOLDIERS) AND KURDISH CITIZENS IN THE NORTHERN REGION TO CARRY ARMS.

THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT NOW THAT PEACE AND STABILITY HAVE BEEN RESTORED AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS APPROVED THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE KURDS ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH MUSTAFA BARZANI'S STATEMENT A FEW DAYS AGO, WE HAVE DECIDED TO BAN THE CARRYING OF ARMS BY THE PESHMERGA AND CITIZENS. ANYONE CONTRAVENING THE BAN WILL RECEIVE THE SEVEREST PUNISHMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

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25 March, 1970.

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Dear Christopher -

The Kurdish Problem

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--- The agreement reached between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders was welcomed by the Soviet Union and a number of articles expressing satisfaction with this development appeared in the press. I attach a copy of one by Izvestia's commentator Kudryartsev, who was recently in Iraq, which seems to sum up Soviet reaction.

Yours ever -

Nick

(N. H. Livingston)

C.L.G. Mallaby, Esq.,  
Eastern European and Soviet Department,  
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REPUBLIC ARABS AND KURDS

V. Kudryavtsev

March 11, 1970, will go down in the history of modern Iraq as a day to remember. This day saw the signing of an agreement on a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem which has been the cause of a 9-year fratricidal war between the Arabs and Kurds. It was marvellous to be present in the towns and villages of Iraq and feel the joy of the people in connection with this important event. There were demonstrations and meetings of many thousands of people everywhere, and speeches were made by the leaders of the republic and representatives of the Kurd population, including two sons of Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. And this, if one is to take into account the traditions of the Orient, was an expression of the profound trust in the agreement. This was a symbol of the beginning of a serious reduction in the antagonism which had accumulated over many years.

For three days Iraq celebrated the establishment of the long-awaited domestic peace. In all the towns of Middle and Southern Iraq one could see Kurds in the military uniform of the national detachments of "peshmerga" who felt themselves full-fledged citizens of the binational republic. The public regarded the signing of the agreement as a truly noteworthy event.

The same assessment, with a view to future development offered by the agreement, is made by progressive forces outside Iraq. Recalling the history of Iraq and everything that the country had to go through in the past few decades, one can realise that from the viewpoint of an Iraqi this event has historic significance. And this assessment does not pale because, as we were told by the Iraqis, a good deal of work has still to be done to implement all the clauses in the document, and this because imperialism and domestic reaction continue the struggle for the trump cards they are losing against the Iraqi revolution.

The happiness of the people of Iraq is particularly easy to understand because the country's historical development has been no bed of roses. There has been many a conqueror of the fertile land between the two great rivers--the Tigris and Euphrates. There were many who fought to possess Mesopotamia. We shall not delve into the history of Assyria and Babylonia, the reign of that formidable conqueror--the Persian King Cyrus, of the Arab Caliphates when Mesopotamia changed hands. She also liked under the Mongol conquerors. The all-mighty Timur swept across her with his troops. In the 17th century she turned into a backward enclave of the Osman Empire. She was



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also prey to the English commercial companies which blazed a trail to India.

Later, in the period of imperialism, Mesopotamia was the object of contention between British and German imperialism. As it marched eastwards, the Kaiser Empire launched what was for those times the stupendous project of building a railway known in literature under the code name of "Three Bs"--Berlin--Bosphorus--Baghdad. The First World War spoiled this dream of Kaiser Germany. And Britain which sent an army of 400,000 strong to capture Mesopotamia, sacrificed many human lives and spent a sum of 150 million pounds sterling, which was quite fantastic in those days.

130,000 Arabs and Kurds participated in the uprising against British imperialism in 1920. Together they shed their blood for freedom and independence. The uprising was suppressed not so much by the British occupation army of 120,000 strong as by the cunning policy of the colonialists who fanned up national (by instigating Arabs against the Kurds) and religious (Arabs are mostly Shiites, and the Kurds are primarily Sunnites) feuds. There is hardly any need to say that the imperialists whipped up tribal contradictions in every way, to weaken both the Arabs and Kurds.

And though under the influence of the defeat of the Nazis and due to the vigorous growth of the national-liberation movement among the Afro-Asian peoples, the so-called mandate kingdom of Hashimites in Iraq came to an end, but the poisonous seeds of national and religious dissent have been felt until recently. The imperialists also kept a watchful eye on Iraq, her oil and strategic positions after 1958, when the USA occupied the Lebanon, and Britain occupied Jordan, and prepared for intervention against the republic, in Baghdad. Using domestic reaction, they managed, in 1961, to start a fratricidal war between the Arabs and Kurds, a war which has ended only now, in March 1970. From 1961 onwards, all reactionary forces or imperialist regimes which made overtures to reaction, used the Kurd problem for their own selfish interests, as they boosted military operations in the North or decreased them somewhat, to maintain power without a really strong social foundation in the country. Such was the case, for instance, in 1962, when in March that year a decree was issued "On amnesty to the participants in the Kurd uprising", followed by statements by the existing government about the desire for a peaceful settlement. Yet, all this was merely a frame-up to lure the leaders of the Kurd national-liberation movement into a trap. The result was favourable to all ill-wishers of independent Iraq: Mutual distrust became even bitterer and bias which had accumulated throughout decades.



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There was also a third happy party, imperialism, which has always coveted Iraqi oil and her strategic advantages. There was one more statement on the desire for peaceful settlement, in 1966. Yet, this too came to nought because of resistance by reactionary domestic elements. The fratricidal war continued and mutual distrust increased. And it was not before the revolution of July 17, 1968, which brought the Baath party to power, that a solution was mapped out to terminate military operations. The talks, which began three months ago, led to the conclusion of the agreement of March 11. This was a result of tremendous efforts on the part of all progressive forces in Iraq, especially the Communist Party, which in spite of the very difficult conditions of working underground and the death of its finest representatives in jail and from executions, continued a courageous struggle for a peaceful settlement of the Kurd problem which impeded the opportunities for the country's development, a feature which served the interests of the imperialists and their servitors in the country.

The Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK), founded on the amalgamation of several national-democratic organisations in 1945, from the very beginning of its existence, came out for national autonomy within the framework of a single Iraqi state. Separatism, which would weaken the anti-imperialist forces of the Iraqi people as a whole, was alien to the DPK.

It will be remembered that the Fourth Congress of the DPK in October 1959 adopted a programme calling for efforts to safeguard and consolidate Iraq as a bi-national state of Arabs and Kurds, and for the granting of national autonomy to the Kurds within a single Iraq. Also typical of the stand taken by the DPK was the expulsion at the Sixth Congress in 1964 of former General Secretary Ibrahim Demoud and his supporters for their opposition to a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue.



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The agreement, concluded on March 11 of this year, not only put an end to the fratricidal war. It also maps out practical steps in the field of the political rights, the economy, and the culture of the peoples. The translation of these measures into life, Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin said in their congratulatory telegram to the President and Prime-Minister of Iraq, Ahmed Hassan Bakr, "will help strengthen national unity and friendship between the two fraternal peoples of the Iraqi Republic--the Arabs and Kurds, the successful implementation of socio-economic transformations in the country in the interests of the entire Iraqi people, and the enhancement of their living standards and well-being".

The agreement envisages the introduction of addenda into the provisional Constitution of Iraq that the Iraqi people consist of two main nationalities--Arabs and Kurds.

The Constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurds and other minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity (the Kurds make up 19 per cent of the Iraqi population). The Kurdish language is proclaimed as official, along with Arabic. One of the country's VicePresidents should be a Kurd. The Kurds will participate directly in legislative and executive bodies of the central and local authorities.

Great attention is paid in the agreement to problems of culture and education as a whole. In Sulaimaniya, for instance, a Kurdish University has been set up, and a Kurdish faculty opened at the Institute of Philology; teaching in the Kurdish areas will be effected in the native tongue.

Certain propositions in the agreement aim at making the life of the people easier. They concern the issuance of allowances to families of Kurds, who fell on the fields of battle; the return of Kurds and Arabs to native lands; special undertakings on abolishing unemployment, and many other things. After a census is taken, it is planned to make changes in the administrative division in the north with the prevalence of the Kurdish population in one or another area taken into consideration. Agreement has already been reached on the founding of a special Kurdish province. The national dignity of the Kurds is also not being hurt in the solution of such a complicated question as the future status of the Kurdish armed forces. For instance, the irregular units of Kurdish patriots (peshmerga) remain in the capacity of a national guard.



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The mention made at the beginning of this article on the harsh treatment of Iraq by history is not accidental. It is not so simple and easy removing the negative effects that have accumulated in the long history of this truly long-suffering country. But one of the main conditions for this removal has been created, and it is now necessary to use it ably and patiently for the consolidation of the bi-national state.

In an interview with Soviet correspondents, one of the leaders of the Baath Party, Mohammed Mufub, Governor of the Basra Province, assessing the Revolution of July 17, 1968, observed that it liberated the Iraqi peasantry, i.e., the greater part of the population, from the dominance of the feudal lords, and what was most important, returned them their human dignity.

The agreement of March 11 is of equally great importance. It, within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, returned national dignity to the Kurds, which had been proudly borne by them through all the years of imperialist domination and the sway of the local reactionaries.

In our conversation with Saddam Hussein Tikriti, Vice-President of the Council of Command of the Revolution, we, notably, realised that a search was being made for those measures which would be the most correct way in erasing that mutual distrust which had<sup>been</sup> built up between the Arabs and Kurds over years and years. We agreed with him that this way lies through socio-economic transformations, which will raise the material and cultural standards of the people and, at the same time, completely uproot the internal feudal and all other pro-imperialist reactionary forces. The latter forces are the ones who stir up national and religious discord in an effort to disunite the Iraqi peoples and weaken the country's resistance to its enemies and ill-wishers.

The leaders of the Arabs and Kurds are well aware of this. After the signing of the agreement, Mustafa Barzani declared that the Democratic Party of Kurdistan fully supports the law on the agrarian reform and the distribution of land among the peasants in the north of Iraq, just like this is taking place in other areas of the country, in order to free the peasantry from feudal exploitation. A lively discussion is also going on in Iraq on such a vital issue in this respect as the setting up of a National Front, a component part of which the Democratic Party of Kurdistan would become.



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It can be said without exaggeration that the implementation of the agreement of March 11 will likewise be a strong blow at imperialism and its agents inside Iraq and other Arab countries. The Iraqi people will be able to concentrate their efforts on the main task of the present stage, that of the common struggle of the Arab countries against the forces of imperialism, for the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, which will undoubtedly facilitate the consolidation of unity of the Arab countries in this struggle.

The peaceful settlement of the Kurd problem in Iraq will raise the international prestige of the Iraqi Republic, and increase the strength of the national-liberation movement of the Afro-Asian peoples. Confirmation of this is the assurance given by the DPK leader, Mustafa Barzani, that the Kurds support their Arab brothers, "who are fighting for their motherland and for the restoration of their usurped rights."

The prospects, opening up as a result of the peaceful settlement, of internal progressive development and a successful struggle against the imperialists and their Israeli hirelings have struck joy in the hearts of the Iraqis, brought them out in great numbers into the squares of cities and rural communities, and, for the first time after so many years, made them feel the strength and possibilities of unity of all the peoples inhabiting the Iraqi Republic. They do not forget their friends. Learning on the support of these friends, Iraq was able to put an end to the fratricidal war, caused by the machinations of the imperialist reactionaries. We felt this wherever we got together with the Iraqis in these significant days of March.

(Izvestia, March 20. In full.)



NEG 1/2.

President Baker's Press Conference of 28th March(a) Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 28.3.70Excerpts from report:

President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr held an important press conference today at the National Council. About 100 Arab and foreign journalists and representatives of the local press, the Iraqi News Agency, and the radio and television were present...

Opening the press conference, the President said: ... Our country is now passing through a new phase - the phase of establishing foundations for national unity on the basis of fraternity and fateful ties between the Arab and the Kurdish nationalities. The 11th March statement was a decisive blow to the hopes of imperialism, Zionism and reaction. It was a great turning point not only with respect to our revolutionary procession in Iraq but to the fight of peoples in the entire area. The statement will enable Iraq to play a bigger and better role in the Arab and international fields. It will have positive effects on the balance of power in the Arab area...

Before I answer your questions, I wish to state briefly which articles of the historic 11th March statement have been implemented. The national Government dissolved the irregular force and received its arms and equipment. The Government then reconsidered the five-year plan for the next five years beginning this year to develop and reconstruct the area regrettably affected by the past circumstances, taking into consideration what has happened to the northern area in particular.

Roads have been repaired and public utilities in the area have begun to revive economically. Local civil administrations have resumed their responsibilities. The Government has prepared a draft Retirement Law granting monthly salaries to the families of the martyrs involved in the incidents in northern Iraq. Instructions have been issued to provinces and rectors of universities to reinstate students, who failed because of the incidents in the North, to their colleges, institutes, and schools preparatory to normalisation of the situation in the area.

The Revolution Command Council has prepared a draft of the new provisional Constitution which incorporates our Kurdish people. The new Constitution will be announced soon. The Revolution Command Council has also prepared the draft Law on the National Council. The National Council will exercise certain legislative powers now exercised by the revolution Command Council. It will be formed of representatives of the two Parties and representatives of trade unions, federations, popular organisations and certain national elements. Vice-Presidents will be appointed soon and one of them will be a Kurd. A new Cabinet will be formed this week. The new Cabinet will include a number of our fraternal Kurds and certain national and patriotic elements in addition to the Ba'thist Ministers...

(b) Baghdad home service in Arabic 04.00 GMT 29.3.70Excerpts from questions and answers part of press conference, read by announcer:

... Q. (Cairo 'Al-Jumhuriyah'): President Nixon of the USA made a statement at an unscheduled press conference at the end of last week in which he said that the USA would adopt a certain position should the balance of power in the Middle East change to Israel's disadvantage. What is Your Excellency's opinion about this stand?

P.O. P.M.M. 2/2



A. I ask the questioner: Has not the USA already adopted this position? Do you believe it is restraining itself and is only working to maintain the balance between Israel and the other States? What is the meaning of the continuous and generous supply of US Phantoms and other offensive weapons to Israel?...

Q. (Amman 'Ad-Difa'): Lebanese reactionary forces are attempting to contain and obstruct fida'i action in Lebanon. What is Iraq's attitude to this, particularly in view of the resumption of clashes in Beirut in the past few days?

A. We have often stated that fida'i action is one of the major guarantees for the liberation of Palestine and the other usurped Arab territory. We have stated that it is our duty and the duty of the liberated Arab States to protect and support fida'i action. Therefore, we condemn any attempt to contain fida'i action or hamper its basic tasks. We call on all revolutionary forces to be alert with regard to the dangers to fida'i action from the plots of reaction and imperialism...

Q. (Amman 'Akhbar al-Usbu'): Observers note that Your Excellency has not participated in the summit conferences and that Iraq did not participate in the recent Islamic conference in Saudi Arabia. Why has the 17th July revolution taken this position?

A. Iraq participated in the fifth Arab summit conference and the conferences of the front line Arab States. The seriousness of Iraq's participation does not depend on my heading the Iraqi delegation. Iraq submitted to the Rabat conference a positive, integral plan to confront the challenges and dangers to our nation from world imperialism. Our country's role in all the conferences in which we participated was effective and fruitful. We did not believe the Islamic conference would be useful to the Arab nation and to the Palestine cause. The results have proved the correctness of our evaluation.

Q. (Cairo 'Al-Jumhuriyah'): What is Iraq's position on the plots of imperialism and its ally - the Shah's Government - against the Arabian Gulf Amirates?

A. One of the basic nationalist tasks of the 17th July revolution is to support and protect the Arab character of the Gulf Amirates. This should also be a basic task of all Arab Governments and the popular and national forces in the Arab homeland.

Q. (Cairo 'Al-Ahram'): Will autonomous rule in the Kurdish areas be put into effect after the population census there or will it be applied first in the areas where there is a clear Kurdish majority?

A. The Revolution Command Council's statement referred to a census in areas where there was a Kurdish majority. The statement also said that the exploitation of natural resources would be the responsibility of the Republic's authorities, since autonomous rule would operate within the framework of these Government authorities. The Governorate Law would be amended to conform with the contents of the 11th March statement...

Q. (Agence France Presse): Can Your Excellency indicate whether the army forces will be withdrawn from the area referred to in the 11th March statement?

A. The presence and deployment of the Iraqi Armed Forces inside the country depends on the requirements of national defence and security against foreign dangers...

Q. (Middle East News Agency): The statement on the settlement of the Kurdish problem has aroused the interest of the Arab and world public. The settlement is considered a positive step in the solution of side disputes. These side disputes divert attention from the real danger threatening the Arabs from Zionism and imperialism. The Arab masses, which have followed this statement with interest, want to know from Your Excellency to what extent the solution of the Kurdish problem will affect the development of the current battle with Israel?



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ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 247

31ST MARCH 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTER No. 10
NEQ 1/2

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CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 247 OF 31ST MARCH 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO TEHERAN, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY AND AGENCY), BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND WASHINGTON.

PRESIDENT BAKR GAVE AN UNPRECEDENTED PRESS CONFERENCE ON SATURDAY 28TH MARCH TO DESCRIBE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN IMPLEMENTING THE 11TH MARCH MANIFESTO ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH SETTLEMENT AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS GENERALLY ON IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ATTENDED BY INVITATION.

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KURDISH SETTLEMENT THE THREE MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST WERE:

A. THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD STARTED TO DISBAND THE IRREGULAR FORCES AND TO RECEIVE THEIR ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

B. THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL HAD COMPLETED THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BILL UNDER WHICH THE COUNCIL WOULD GRANT SOME OF ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWERS COMPLEMENTING THOSE EXERCISED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD COMPRISE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO POLITICAL PARTIES (BA'ATH AND KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY) AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF FEDERATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, POPULAR ORGANISATIONS AND CERTAIN NATIONAL ELEMENTS.

C. THAT NEW MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED WITHIN THE WEEK.

3. THE QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS CAME IN THE MAIN FROM LEBANESE, JORDANIAN, SYRIAN AND UAR NEWSPAPERS, AND THE MAJOR QUESTION UNDERLYING MANY OF THOSE POSED WAS THE FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE IRAQI ARMY WHICH WOULD BE FREED FROM THEIR DUTIES IN

CONFIDENTIAL

/THE NORTH.



THE NORTH. THE PRESIDENT GAVE NO SPECIFIC ANSWER BUT SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH ISSUE WOULD OFFER THE ARMED FORCES GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCHARGE THEIR DUTIES AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE IRAQI NATION, BOTH ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST.

4. IN A SINGLE REFERENCE TO THE TENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE ARAB BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY THE PRESIDENT REVEALED THAT THE DRAFT SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH ISSUE AS EXPRESSED IN THE 11TH MARCH MANIFESTO HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE CONFERENCE.

5. IN ANSWER TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE ARAB GULF, NONE OF WHICH SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE BAHRAIN/IRAN EXERCISE, THE PRESIDENT SAID 'THE BOLSTERING AND PROTECTION OF THE ARAB CHARACTER OF THE GULF PRINCIPALITIES IS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL TASKS OF THE 17TH JULY REVOLUTION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL TASKS OF ALL GOVERNMENTS AND POPULAR AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES THROUGHOUT THE ARAB HOMELAND'.

6. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PISH MERGA FORCES OF BARZANI AND THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE TALABANIST KURDS. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO MERGE THE PISH MERGA WITH THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND DECLARED 'THE SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN AT NOBODY'S EXPENSE. ALL IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES WERE TO BE LIQUIDATED.

7. SINCE THE CONFERENCE, 12 MINISTERIAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED AMONG THE 8 NEW MINISTERS APPOINTED ARE FIVE KURDS, WHOSE MOST IMPORTANT PORTFOLIOS ARE: AGRICULTURE, WORKS AND HOUSING, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH. A NEW MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT HAS ALSO BEEN FORMED.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HAILED IN THE LOCAL PRESS UNDER THE BANNER HEADLINES 'SENSATIONAL REVELATIONS BY BAKR'. THERE WAS NOTHING SENSATIONAL IN HIS STATEMENT OR IN HIS ANSWERS TO THE PREPARED QUESTIONS. ON THE ARAB GULF FOR INSTANCE THE ANSWER WAS NOTABLE MORE FOR ITS OMISSION THAN FOR ANYTHING HE SAID.



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BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO.247 TO FCO.

-3-

NEVERTHELESS HIS HANDLING OF THE OCCASION WAS SOMETHING OF A PERSONAL SUCCESS, AND HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED CRITICIZING IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS. NOR WAS THERE ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF OURSELVES.

F.CO.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO CCAIRRO TEHERAN, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY AND AGENCY), KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.

MR BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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# The Monitoring Report



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31 March 1970

## I - THE USSR

09.00 GMT 25.3.70 - 09.00 GMT 29.3.70

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

1970

NEQ 1/2

European Security: British and US "Obstructionism" Britain and the USA were again accused in English-language and home service commentaries of assuming an "obstructionist" attitude towards the convention of an all-European collective security conference. Whereas a year ago the USA's first reaction had been that of open rejection of the idea, the force of public opinion had forced Washington to change its tactics: its policy now was to indulge in all kinds of quiet obstructionism, the hope of delaying its convention, rather than openly to oppose the conference. "The balanced reduction of armed forces" was the latest ploy in this game, which was not devoid of a propaganda aspect. There were special agencies already in existence which were competent to discuss matters such as this. Britain too, while still talking about the conference, had changed its approach, for the Government was now hedging the idea around with so many reservations that a rejection of the proposal was the only interpretation that could be put on its attitude. \*

The New Government in Italy would produce no change in the conduct of the country's affairs, a news commentator declared in a broadcast in Italian. The monopolies would continue to enjoy protection, regardless of the fact that the Italian people had shown that they had no confidence in a Government of this complexion. \*

Middle East Armed Strength In a commentary given wide circulation in external service broadcasts, Ivan Samuilovskiy accused Israel and the Zionists of making a terrific fuss about the supply of Soviet arms to the UAR and of calmly ignoring the fact that they were being supplied to the victims of aggression for self-defence. No mention was made of the categories of arms involved. In a statement broadcast in Arabic, Dr. Shafiq al-Kamali, the Iraqi Minister who recently visited the Soviet Union, speaking of the settlement of the Kurdish question, said it would help to redistribute forces in the Middle East to achieve a better balance there. The military force which had been engaged in northern Iraq would go to Palestine to play an effective role there. \*

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations The 'New York Times', the 'Guardian' and some Italian newspapers were accused by German Mitkevich in a broadcast in Serbo-Croat of conducting a campaign to undermine Soviet-Yugoslav relations by attributing to the USSR complicity in "fantastic machinations", including creating internal opposition in Yugoslavia. This was part of the West's love of sensationalism. Paul Hoffman had written of the growth of separatism in Croatia and Slovenia; Victor Zorza about some kind of conspiracy by Yugoslav generals; and the Italian paper 'Borghese' had even asserted that Moscow had decided to "liquidate Yugoslavia". This was not the first time Western propaganda had tried to upset Soviet-Yugoslav relations: in 1968 it was the mythical danger of a Soviet invasion; Djilas's anti-communist and anti-Soviet views had been represented as those of the Yugoslav people; and then last December an effort was made to imply that Gromyko had been given a cold reception. \*

The Chief of the Afghan General Staff was reported to have arrived in the USSR on holiday as Marshal Grechko's guest. \*

\*For details see Appendices

P.S. P.M.M. 2/4

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**II - EASTERN EUROPE**

09.00 GMT 25. 3. 70 - 14.00 GMT 28. 3. 70

**East-West German Relations** The need for Bonn's recognition of the GDR as an equal sovereign State under international law was a dominant theme in broadcasts and agency transmissions from Eastern Germany during the period under review. A Deutschland-sender commentary (25. 3. 70), entitled 'Berlin is the Capital of the Sovereign GDR', argued that four-Power responsibility for the city had ended with 'the violations of the Potsdam Agreement by the three Western Powers'. Hence West Berlin was the only territory 'on and amidst the GDR territory' for which 'there exists four-Power responsibility'. Contrary to this legal position, the three Western Powers still 'adhered to the fiction that they continue to have a right of occupation in West Berlin' and had even allowed the Federal Republic to 'misuse West Berlin for a policy of provocations'. Peace in Europe demanded an absolute end to such misuse of West Berlin by West German imperialists\*. On 25th March, 'Neues Deutschland' - according to ADN (25. 3. 70) - demanded the 'disappearance' of the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin\*, but following its suspension the same paper - again according to ADN (28. 3. 70) - described the Western move as 'a long overdue and yet half-hearted and grudging retreat'; to demand a 'reward' from the socialist States was 'effrontery'\*\*. An East German radio commentator (27. 3. 70) ridiculed the recent remark by Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, that the 'special relationship' envisaged by Bonn for the two German States was something like the bonds of the Commonwealth. Surely it was obvious that the 'special relations' of the Commonwealth were merely a new version of colonialism, a new form of British political, ideological and economic expansion in her former possessions. Such an arrangement might suit Bonn but it would not suit the GDR\*\*.

**Czechoslovakia** Although the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty (EE/3336/C/9) was the subject of two commentaries during the period under review, no details of its provision were contained in any monitored material. A 'Tvorba' article, broadcast in full by Prague radio (26. 3. 70), explained that the new treaty 'will enshrine the level of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations achieved during the post-war period' and provide for 'a higher level of mutual co-operation'. It would also comprise 'the relevant conclusions of the Bratislava Declaration ... of August 1968 and the results of the international conference of communist parties of June 1969, touching upon the international obligation of the socialist countries in the defence of socialist achievements'\*. A commentary in Prague radio's transmission for Czechoslovaks abroad (28. 3. 70) stated that 'it was the changed situation in the world which demanded a new treaty'. It was 'in the interest of Czechoslovakia to have her lawful frontiers permanently safeguarded and the achievements of socialist construction preserved. That is the main reason why a new treaty is being prepared and not the validity of the old one extended'. The new treaty would be 'an important contribution to the security not only of the CSSR but also of the entire socialist community'\*\*.

There have again been many attacks on politicians and public figures of 1968. 'Vecerni Praha' on 25th March - according to CTK (25. 3. 70) - devoted an article to the argument that Bohumil Simon, formerly Leading Secretary of the Prague City Committee of the CPCz, was responsible for splitting the Party organisation and very largely responsible for calling the Vysocany Congress\*. The same paper on the following day - according to CTK (26. 3. 70) - held Zdenek Silhan guilty of forming an opposition within the Party and grossly insulting the USSR and its internationalist policy\*. The Bratislava 'Pravda' - according to CTK (27. 3. 70) - attacked the role of 'the cultural group within the Party', notably Cisar, Goldstuecker, Hoffmeister and Helge\*. Karel Janik's regular Prague radio feature 'We Know You Now!' on 28th March dealt with Smrkovsky, in a manner not only criticising his politics but also impugning his honesty\*. Another Prague radio commentary (28. 3. 70) attacked the 'intellectual pseudo-politicians who, in their desire to revise Marx and Lenin, have now reached quite openly anti-Soviet positions'. People like Pelikan, Svitak, Hejzlar, Sik and Goldstuecker were not only 'ingratiating themselves ... with their masters' but were making common cause with post-1948 emigres: 'Hejzlar with Tigris, Goldstuecker with Egon Hostovsky'\*\*.



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
# DAILY TELEGRAPH

Cutting dated 1 APR 1970 ..... 19

## NEW FRONT FOR THE KURDS

EXPECTATIONS THAT IRAQ, as a result of the ending of the Kurdish war, will strengthen its forces deployed against Israel, are now likely to be quickly fainter. It is true that, in the past, agreements between the Iraq Government and the Kurds have broken down, but this time the entry of five Kurds into the newly formed Iraqi Cabinet seems to have set the seal on the settlement. The Kurds have got the regional autonomy and the due representation in the central government for which they have fought so bravely and suffered so cruelly for 10 years.

But it is a good wind that blows nobody ill, and Israel will suffer from whatever increase in stability may now be achieved by the notoriously volatile Iraqi State, 20,000 of whose best troops were tied down by the Kurdish war. Iraq already has about 12,000 men in Jordan and 6,000 in Syria. A report from Amman that the number in Jordan is to be increased by 3,000 seems credible. If it is true that Kurdish irregular forces are also to be sent there, these, judging by the past performance, may well be more troublesome to Israel than the regulars. Probably the main sufferer however will be King HUSSEIN. His authority, prestige and freedom of action in the event of possibilities for ending the Arab-Israeli war cannot but be reduced as a result. He is drawn further into the murky maelstrom of Iraqi politics. Iraq, well away from the firing line, never subscribed to the cease-fire and is all for waging the war to the bitter end.



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March 16th, 1970

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Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

NRQ 1/2.

Libya) firmly believes that any kind of Arab bloc, be it political, economic or otherwise, is always better than disunity and individuality of which the Arab nation has been suffering during its long struggle. I believe that the difference in government systems in Arab countries must not preoccupy us away from our fateful goals, and must not be a hinderance to our getting together in our battle against Zionism, or in our liberation from economic subservience, especially where our oil wealth is concerned.").

-Settlement of the royalties expensing problem between the companies and Arab governments, which has brought the producer governments an additional royalty of 10 cents per barrel.

-The entry of the UAR into the oil industry as a potential exporter.

NASSER PRAISES KURD ACCORD IN IRAQ

Iraq

Barzani's Brief Comment On Iranian Kurds

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR yesterday praised the Iraqi-Kurdish agreement, in a cable to President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, which was broadcast both by RADIO BAGHDAD and RADIO CAIRO.

President Nasser hailed the agreement as "a great step on the road of national unity in Iraq", "providing a gigantic support to the Pan-Arab struggle... against the Arabs' real enemy represented in the alliance between racist Zionism and international imperialism."

Barzani. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish insurgent leader, has said that the Kurdish Democratic Party had nothing to do with the Iranian Kurds. He was speaking in an interview with INA, his second since the Kurdish declaration was made on March 11th.

He was asked to comment on the "reactionary regime of the Shah, which is subservient to imperialism," Barzani was quoted as saying that the Iranian regime's "connections and commitments were known to all." He did not elaborate, and apparently avoided making direct criticism of the Shah and of the Iranian regime. (More on Pages 9&10).

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POLL ON LEBANESE PRESIDENCY REPORTED

Lebanon

Beirut's AL NAHAR has reported the results of a poll on the Lebanese presidential campaign, and said that it will produce such a poll once every month until the new President is elected next summer.

In this month's poll, the paper said that 953 persons were questioned in Beirut, its suburbs, Tripoli, Zahle, Jbeil and Sidon. The results showed that former President General Fuad Chehab was still leading as the main candidate, followed by former President Camille Chamoun.

General Chehab received 25.50% of the votes, and Chamoun 22.1%. Deputy Raymond Edde was third, receiving 14.3%. Deputy Maurice Gemayel, of the Phalangist Party, received 5.6%, and Pierre Gemayel, the Phalangist leader and Public Works Minister, 5.4%.

Military Or Civilian. Eighty-five percent said they preferred that the President be a civilian, while 11.4% said they preferred a military man. As many as 77.2% said they preferred to have the President elected directly by the people, instead of by Parliament as is the case now. Also, 73.4% said that they preferred that the election be free of the regulation that the President should belong to a certain confession. Under the National Covenant of 1943, the President is always a Maronite Christian.

One paper, AL SHAAB, pro-UAR, today challenged AL NAHAR's poll and condemned it as "fake."



Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

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ing Damascus with Homs. A communique by Fatah, quoted by "Voice of Al Asifa", and carried this morning by several newspapers here, said that at 7:20 p.m. Sunday, several enemy helicopters crossed the Lebanese border and flew north to Rachaya, Kfar Quq and Yanta, and tried to drop paratroppers but the attempt was foiled by Fatah commandos.

-Monday morning, the Israelis claimed that their commandos crossed the Syrian territory, and blew up two gun posts and a road bridge linking two villages from where commandos allegedly operated. The Syrians denied the claim. At 2 p.m., the Israelis shelled the Lebanese villages of Rachaya el Foukhar and Kfar Hamam. The Israelis claimed they shelled commando positions across the Hasbani in Lebanese territory.

SUEZ CANAL FIGHTING. Egyptian fighter planes yesterday intercepted 12 enemy planes which tried to raid Egyptian positions in the Suez Canal area and shot down one of them, a Cairo spokesman announced. The Israelis denied the claim, and said they were the ones who shot down an Egyptian plane.

AL AHRAM this morning bannered a description of the air battle, and talked about how the UAR fighters chased the enemy planes and stopped them from carrying out their mission.

\* \* \*

LEBANON'S POSITION EXPLAINED. The Lebanese Minister of Information, Mr Osman Dana, yesterday said that Lebanon could not be held responsible for action carried out by the commandos, and emphasized that Lebanon continued to abide by the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel.

The Minister explained Lebanon's position at a press conference here. He said that it is Israel and not Lebanon that is responsible for the continued presence here of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees because Israel continued to refuse to allow them to return to their homeland. Mr Dana also said that Lebanon rejected the Israeli offer of conclusion of peace with Lebanon, because Lebanon was in solidarity with the other Arab states and because peace cannot be concluded while the Israelis continued to occupy Arab territory. He charged that the Israeli statements about peace were only meant to mislead world public opinion.

KURDS JOIN BAGHDAD-SPONSORED COMMANDO GROUP

Iraq

Iraqi Kurds have joined the Baghdad-based commando group, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and have in fact taken part in several operations against the Israeli enemy.

This was reported this morning by Baghdad's AL THAWRA, which speaks for the ruling Baath Party which sponsors the ALF. The paper disclosed what it described as "this secret" in covering the ceremony held at a camp near Baghdad for the "graduation" of new members of the ALF. It did not say, however, whether the new members of the ALF included Kurds.

Before the graduation, the new ALF members engaged in military exercises. The ceremony was attended by Shibli Al Aisami, Assistant Secretary General of the Pan-Arab Command of the Baath Party, which is in direct charge of the ALF, and by an army representative, Col. Adnan Ahmed Al Jobouri.

In a statement to AL THAWRA, Mr Al Aisami, who is a Syrian and second in command in the Pan-Arab leadership to Secretary General Michel Aflak, "hailed the desire by our brothers, the Kurds, to join the commando action." This, Mr Aisami, whose statements were also repro-



Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

duced by BAGHDAD RADIO, was evidence that "Arab and Kurdish guns will now be directed at the common enemy, Zionism and imperialism."

(The news that Kurds have joined the ALF came to confirm certain reports which said that the Baathist regime was planning to have "Saladdin Horsemen", or some of them, join the ALF. "Horsemen" were originally recruited by the Baathists themselves in 1963, when the Baathists were in power in Iraq the first time, from pro-Government Kurdish tribesmen to fight the Kurdish insurgents under Mulla Mustafa Barzani. At one time, the Horsemen were said to number as many as 10,000. A secret provision in the Kurdish-Government agreement announced last March 11th, was said to call for dissolution of the "Horsemen." This Kurdish force had during years of fighting on side of the Iraqi army in the north acquired considerable experience in guerrilla warfare).

Talabani. Jalal Talabani, who had led the anti-Barzani faction among Kurdish intellectuals, yesterday sent a cable to President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr expressing full support to the March 11th Declaration for settlement of the Kurdish problem.

Support to the Declaration also came from AL NOUAR, the Baghdad daily published by the Talabani group.

NIXON'S DECISION ON ARMS TO ISRAEL DUE THIS WEEK  
U.S. ENVOY HERE IN WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION

U.S.  
Policy

Most Arab newspapers today gave wide coverage to the White House announcement in Washington yesterday that President Richard Nixon will announce later this week his decision on whether to provide Israel with additional weapons, especially Phantom fighter-bombers, or not. The announcement, the reports said, will be made by the State Department.

There had been conflicting speculations as to the decision reached by the U.S. President. Earlier, some reports said that Nixon will give Israel the arms. A CBS report over the weekend said that Israel will not get the arms. Interest was heightened by the recall to Tel Aviv of the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Ytzhak Rabin, for consultations. Rabin has now gone back to Washington for what he described in a statement to newsmen "hard bargaining."

Cairo's AL AHRAM yesterday reported that Nixon will give Israel the weapons, but that an official announcement to this effect would be avoided. Syrian papers, as quoted by DAMASCUS RADIO, today repeated the Cairo report (see also Page 6).

Porter For Washington. Meanwhile, Beirut's AL NAHAR reported that Mr Dwight Porter, the U.S. Ambassador here, left yesterday for Washington. The paper quoted unidentified diplomatic sources as saying that the State Department wanted to hold consultations with Ambassador Porter on the Middle East situation in general and about the recent Israeli threats to Lebanon in particular. The paper said the U.S. Embassy here would not say how long Mr Porter would be gone, but that informed source said that the visit will last two weeks.

(At his press conference yesterday, Information Minister Osman Dana was asked about reports that the U.S. had given Lebanon assurances against Israeli threats aimed at Lebanon. The Minister referred the questioner to the Lebanese Foreign Minister, but emphasized that the assurances for Lebanon spring from the Lebanese people themselves. Originally, reports about the U.S. assurances came from AL NAHAR).



(61)

NEQ 1/2

(REPUBLIC OF IRAQ)IRAQI ARMY WILL NOT LEAVE FIRELINES BEFORE ISRAEL IS "ROOTED OUT", COMMENT DECLARESArmy  
Commandos

The Iraqi forces will not leave the frontlines until Israel is "rooted out." The emphasis came in the course of an editorial yesterday by Baghdad's semi-official AL JUMHOURIA. The paper was commenting on the declaration for settlement of the Kurdish problem, and on the graduation of new members of the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the commando group sponsored by the Baghdad-based Pan-Arab Command of the Baath Party.

The paper wrote: "The peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish problem allows our gallant army to devote itself entirely to its pan-Arab duties for liberation of the occupied territory. Our contingents will not leave the firelines before the imperialist base (Israel) has been rooted out."

(This appears to be the first Iraqi reply to statements made by Syrian leaders recently alleging that Iraq was withdrawing troops from the Eastern Front --see our bulletin yesterday).

ALF. AL JUMHOURIA continued that the ALF graduates will now join the other forces in the frontlines to participate along with the Iraqi army in the liberation struggle "against imperialism, and its base, Israel."

It will be recalled that the graduation ceremony was held Monday at a camp outside Baghdad, and was attended by Mr Chibli Al Aisami, Assistant Secretary General of the Pan-Arab Command of the Baath Party. It will also be recalled that Baghdad's AL THAWRA has revealed that Kurds have joined the ALF. The paper quoted Mr Aisami as warmly praising the "desire of our brothers, the Kurds, in joining the commando movement" (see our bulletin of March 17th).

KURDISH QUESTION. But the attention of Iraq and its media continued to be focussed almost entirely on the settlement of the Kurdish question:

Editorially, AL THAWRA, which speaks for the ruling Baath Party, has urged the Iraqi masses to keep up their vigilance against what the paper described as "imperialist and reactionary attempts" to undermine the settlement of the Kurdish problem. It said that past experience has shown that "imperialist plots" against Iraq usually follow a big achievement by the national government.


The paper made a particular warning against rumours, and said that the rumours are spread by imperialist quarters "to create the proper psychological atmosphere for staging suspicious moves." The paper did not say what these moves could be.

Yesterday, also, Baghdad press editorials were concentrated on the formation of the 9-man committee for implementation of the March 11th declaration on the Kurdish question. They offered this as evidence that the Government was serious in implementing the promises in the declaration.

Aid To Rawanduz. According to AL JUMHOURIA, the Iraqi Government has decided to allocate 3 million dinars --(one dinar is a little more than a sterling pound)-- for implementation of economic, industrial, and agricultural projects, and for reconstruction plans in the Rawanduz area. This was the main scene of fighting during the past years between the Kurdish insurgents and the Iraqi army.

Under one of the projects, a new and modern city will be established to house Kurds whose homes had been destroyed during the fighting, the paper said.





(62)  
NE

Iraq

The Ba'athist Government's Settlement  
With the Kurds

SUMMARY

1. Both parties declare the settlement announced on 11 March to be final. (Paragraph 1)
2. The Ba'athist régime took some time to evolve a more positive approach to the Kurdish problem than their sundry predecessors over the ten years of intermittent fighting. (Paragraph 2).
3. Negotiations began in earnest late in 1969 and ran into the expected difficulties but breakdown was avoided by the two leading figures accepting an incomplete compromise. (Paragraphs 3 and 4).
4. The outcome, which was formally not an Agreement but a Declaration by the R.C.C., deals adequately with the easier problems but is obscure on the major ones, such as the sharing of power at the centre, the future of Barzani's 20,000 irregulars, the disposal of the rival Talabaniist partisans, the meaning of "autonomy" and the future status of the Kurdish Democratic Party and of Barzani himself, its Chairman. There is very probably an unpublished protocol. (Paragraphs 5 - 7).
5. Implementation is entrusted formally to a Joint Committee (whose membership is unimpressive) but the gradual removal of mutual distrust is the greater problem. (Paragraph 8).
6. The Soviet Government certainly played a role in the settlement but its extent is uncertain. (Paragraph 9).
7. If the pacification of the Kurds proves effective, where will the Ba'athists direct the nervous energy released? Reinforcement of the "Eastern Command"? trouble-making in Persian Kurdistan? Kuwait? or just general preparation for the future confrontation with Iran in the Gulf? (Paragraphs 10 - 12).
8. They ought of course to use the opportunity to cultivate their own garden, the Kurdish kallyard in particular.

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But will they? Increased internal self-confidence should have at least some beneficial consequences. (Paragraphs 13 - 14).

9. On balance, the settlement is probably a good thing for all of us - if it sticks. (Paragraph 15).

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BAGHDAD.

27 March 1970

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Sir,

As already reported by telegram, the Iraqi Government and the Kurds of Iraq led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani state that the Revolutionary Command Council's declaration of the 11th of March represents the achievement of a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem and has put an end to the Kurdish revolt against the central government which has gone on spasmodically since 1961. In this despatch I have the honour to submit some observations on the nature of this settlement, on the likelihood of its effective implementation, and on its implications for Iraq's policies elsewhere.

2. The Ba'athist Government, which came to power in July 1968, did not for some time show any sign of having better ideas on how to deal with the Kurds than those they had when they were previously in power in 1963 or those which other Iraqi governments had applied in the interim. In brief, these were to contain so far as they were able the extent of the area controlled by the Kurds under Mullah Mustafa Barzani and therefore outside the control of the government in Baghdad, and to weaken him by a combination of military and political pressure exerted latterly through his Kurdish rival, Jalal Talabani, whom the government supported with money and arms. More recently, however, the Government gave effect to certain of the proposals for the settlement of the problem which were put forward by Abdul Rahman al Bazzaz when he was Prime Minister in 1966.

The Right Honourable  
Michael Stewart, C.H., M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

/Thus

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Thus a university was established in Sulaimaniya , a Kurdish Academy of Letters was set up, Kurdish was made the language of instruction in schools in the Kurdish area, an amnesty was declared for those who had taken part in the fighting and a measure of decentralisation of power to the Governorates was introduced. In spite of these propitiatory gestures, sporadic clashes continued throughout 1969, and when in January 1970 it became apparent that serious negotiations were taking place between the Ba'athists and representatives of Mullah Mustafa under cover of a de facto cease fire, there was considerable scepticism, even incredulity, that the two sides could overcome their distrust and antipathy sufficiently to try to reach a settlement of the many difficult issues between them.

3. Little is known of the course of the negotiations. It seems that the initiative came from the Ba'athists and that initial contacts were made in late 1969 in Beirut and in the Kurdish area where emissaries were sent from Baghdad to persuade the Barzenists that the government were acting in good faith and genuinely sought a peaceful settlement. Discussions took place in January and February; on the government side Saddam Hussein al Tikriti, Hardan al Tikriti, Saleh Mehdi Ammash and Murtadha al Hadithi are those names most frequently mentioned as having taken part; Mahmoud Othman, Muhsin Dizaie, Shawkat Akrawi, Ihsan Shirzad and Saleh Yusefi were among those representing the Kurds.

4. The points on which it was particularly difficult to reach agreement included, as was to be expected, the extent to which the Kurds  
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were to share in the formulation of policy and in the exercise of power at the national level, the physical extent of the predominantly Kurdish area and, in particular, whether it included the town of Kirkuk and the nearby oilfields, the degree of autonomy to be given to the Kurdish area and its share of state revenues, the amount to be allocated for the economic development of the area, the future of the Pish Merga (Barzani's armed forces) and Barzani's reputed insistence on some sort of outside guarantee. The talks seemed close to breakdown more than once, and were probably saved by the determination of Saddam Hussein on the one hand and by Barzani's realisation on the other that he would lose little (save Iranian subventions) by taking the best he could get and giving it a try. And he is of course getting old.

5. The outcome of the negotiations was the issue of a Declaration by the Revolutionary Command Council on the 11th of March which recorded various decisions which the R.C.C. had made; simultaneously a telegram from Barzani supporting and welcoming the Declaration was released. (It will be noted that the published settlement does not take the form of an "agreement" (which would be hardly proper for a sovereign Government dealing with a group of its rebellious subjects); but Barzani's signature on a document of some kind was no doubt secured). The announcement was the occasion for mammoth celebrations in Baghdad. (In Mosul, by contrast, where I happened to be at the time and which has Talabanist connections, the rejoicings were noticably perfunctory). Three days public holiday was declared, the third coinciding with the Kurdish New Year.

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6. The text of the R.C.C's Declaration (a translation of the substantive part of which is enclosed) reflects the difficulties of reaching agreement on the more important issues. It is reasonably specific on questions of an amnesty, the use of Kurdish as an official language and as the language of instruction in predominantly Kurdish areas, the principles of appointing Kurds in an equitable proportion to the highest government posts (including one of the Vice-Presidencies and what is referred to as the legislature) and of appointing Kurdish or Kurdish-speaking officials to posts in Kurdish areas, the provision of pensions to the families of Kurds killed in the fighting, the return of Arabs and Kurds to their villages or their resettlement, and other measures of rehabilitation. The R.C.C. have also committed themselves to unifying the administration of the area in which Kurds are predominant and in which they will exercise their national rights and enjoy "autonomy". The definition of this area will be made "on the basis of a census yet to be taken" - a formula evidently designed to overcome the obstacle presented by the Government's refusal to concede the inclusion of Kirkuk in the Kurdish area and by the Kurds' refusal to accept the accuracy of existing statistics on the distribution of population. (How many Kurds displaced in the past from the Kirkuk area will, one wonders, be returned there before the census?). Responsibility for the exploitation of natural resources in the Kurdish area remains significantly the responsibility of the central authorities. In return economic planning is to "assure equal development for the various parts of Iraq".

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7. But on a number of the crucial issues, such as those listed in paragraph 4, the declaration is at least obscure. The omissions lend some colour to the rumours of a "secret protocol" dealing with other matters - conditionally, it may be, on progress being made with the implementation of the published understanding, in much the same way as Barzani's surrender of broadcasting equipment and heavy weapons is already declared conditional. Amongst the more obvious obscurities are:

- (a) The method by which the Kurds are to share in legislative power, at present a jealously guarded Ba'athist monopoly. Vague stories of an undertaking by the Government to set up an elected National Council, on which the Kurds and other minorities would be represented, ring rather hollow - though Barzani's spokesman, Mahmoud Othman, has subsequently been quoted as saying that agreement on this question is expected to be reached within two or three months. The allocation of five Ministries, for which Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party is said to be choosing nominees in a month or two, will give them (since Ministers as such are scarcely more than high-level executives) no share in the policy-making process.
- (b) The future of the Pish Merga, who are said to number over 20,000. Without some kind of outside guarantee, Barzani would not be fool enough to disarm. The declaration does not call upon him to surrender small arms (even conditionally, as in the case of heavy weapons) or to disband  
/his

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his army. It had been expected that the latter would be reconstituted as Frontier Guards in the Kurdish region under at least nominal government control. Both Saddam Hussein and Mahmoud Othman have since been quoted by the press as saying that the Pish Merga would "become part of the Iraqi Army"; but such statements hardly do more than draw attention to the silence of the published settlement on the subject.

- (c) The disposal of Talabani's anti-Barzani irregulars, the Fursan Salahuddin. Indeed the declaration is conspicuously silent on the whole question of Talabani. We have had eye witness reports of old scores being settled in the North with his supporters following the declaration. Talabani himself, despite the fact that a fulsome telegram of support from him was published in the press on the 15th of March, is said to have gone to Switzerland. It may be that the Government has simply left his partisans to make whatever accommodation they can with the new circumstances. The only reference I have seen to the Fursan in the local press disposes of the problem by declaring that they will be sent to fight the Israelis.
- (d) The meaning of "autonomy". The word, or its rough Arabic equivalent (al-hukm adh-dhati) figures only in one passage in the declaration (Article 14), and is hardly applicable to the modest degree of regional self-administration envisaged. There is clearly plenty of scope for future

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misunderstandings in this field, as in others.

- (e) The future of the K.D.P. and of its Chairman, Mullah Mustafa. Although the publicity media have been emphasizing ad nauseam the identity of views of the K.D.P. and the Ba'ath on Palestine and on the usual revolutionary themes, there is no reference to the future of the Party, or its place within the body politic, in the declaration itself. Presumably the Government's intention, despite token gestures of recognition, is to limit the activities of the Party, unless it can be safely Ba'athized, to the Kurdish area. Meanwhile the K.D.P. have announced their intention of holding a Party Congress in May or June.

8. How is the settlement to be implemented? In terms of formal machinery (though the gradual establishment of mutual confidence is the real and much harder requirement) there are references in the declaration to the appointment of a Higher Committee to supervise implementation. Its powers and composition are not there defined. The appointment of a "Peace Committee", subsequently revealed to be the Higher Committee under another name, was announced on the 18th of March. Its Chairman is Murtadha al Hadithi: and it includes a second (military) member of the R.C.C., General Sa'adun Ghaidan. Aziz Sherif, the Communist Minister of Justice, is on it, as are the (existing) Governors of Arbil and Kirkuk. The remaining four members are Kurds; two are described as members of the Political Bureau of the K.D.P. and the other two as members of the Executive Bureau. Both the latter are known to us as erstwhile visitors to the Soviet bloc.





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9. This brings me to the part presumably played by the Soviet Union in promoting the settlement. No one doubts that the Russians have been active behind the scenes: but they have been careful not to take any public credit, and the extent of their supposed involvement may possibly be exaggerated. Neither the Ba'ath nor Barzani are conspicuously responsive to outside dictation. On the other hand it is common knowledge that the continuance of the Kurdish dispute has long been a subject of reproof in Russian dealings with the Ba'ath. And some of the Kurds who have played a leading part in the negotiations are notoriously far to the left.

10. Assuming that the agreement, with or without an element of Soviet supervision, proves sufficiently effective and lasting to enable the régime to turn its attentions elsewhere, where will it turn them? The Government, echoed by the Kurds themselves, has of course announced that the settlement will enable Iraq to concentrate its attention, and more of its armed forces, on the Israeli front. And no doubt King Hussein and everyone else must reckon with at least some Iraqi reinforcement of the Eastern Command, if and when the pacification of the North makes substantial re-deployment possible.

11. What about other Iraqi "fronts"? Inevitably there have been rumours that the opportunity would be taken to foment demands for similar "autonomy" amongst the Kurds of Iran and Turkey. Indeed, General Ammash is said to have given the Turks a (perhaps jocular) warning to that effect when he visited Ankara in January. On the

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16th of March the Iraq News Agency attributed to Barzani himself a curiously equivocal statement that "although the Kurdish movement of Iran has no organisational relationship with the K.D.P. of Iraq, nonetheless the Kurdish people as a whole, like other peoples struggling for their national rights, must assert its freedom". But this apart - and despite the Ba'ath's undoubted desire to repay the Shah in his own coin - Barzani has wisely shown no sign of wishing to give greater offence to the Shah than he has already done by accepting the settlement.

12. Further down the frontier with Iran we have no evidence of any significant reinforcement of Iraqi troops since the 11th of March. It remains my view that the Iraqis have no more desire than the Iranians to push the propaganda war over the Shatt-al-Arab any nearer to active hostilities. It is certainly true, however, that one of the Iraqis' prime motives in pacifying the Kurds is to free themselves in the longer term for their future confrontation with Iran in the Persian Gulf. Whatever views the Iranians for their part may hold of the increased threat from Iraq, there is little doubt that the settlement is unwelcome to Kuwait. There have already been indications from secret sources that the Government of Iraq may once more be turning a covetous eye in that direction. (Parenthetically I would add that a disruptive collision with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which seems increasingly possible, might well drive the Iraqis into a southern adventure.)

13. In theory, of course, it is not towards new foreign adventures anywhere but to the development of the Kurdish area

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/itself





itself that the régime should bend the energies and resources released by the settlement. And it is a fair assumption that this is what the Kurds will press for. One Iraqi in five, after all, is a Kurd; and the centre of gravity in a unified Iraq ought therefore to move metaphorically northwards. But this assumes that the Kurds, armed with the promise of a fair share in the machinery of government, will be able to exert effective pressure on the riverain Sunni Arabs who, under the present as under every past régime, govern Iraq. Hopes have already been expressed in some quarters that Kurdish participation in government will indeed have a restricting effect on the wild men of the Ba'ath, and persuade them to concentrate on cultivating their own back-garden. I hesitate to share these hopes.

14. As for other internal considerations, there can be no doubt that the Government expect their credibility in public eyes to be materially enhanced by the settlement - though there must be some in the higher ranks of the Army, particularly those who have been making a good thing out of the war, who resent it. The Government will certainly seek to use the settlement to impose their social policies in Barzani's not conspicuously socialist domain and to push ahead with them more vigorously elsewhere. If their self-confidence is reinforced by bringing off the settlement, one must hope that this will encourage some degree of relaxation in the nervous intolerance of their political behaviour.





15. All in all, and despite the risks presented by the redirection of the Government's energies to other fields, the settlement (if it sticks) is probably a good thing for all of us. But there is a long way to go before anyone can tell whether it has a chance of permanence or whether history will reveal it as just another fruitless pause in the long Kurdish struggle for a national identity.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Jedda, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Moscow and Washington and to the Political Resident, Bahrain, the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York, and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Brussels.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

W. B. Baqirulawe

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Enclosure to Baghdad Despatch  
1/8 of the 28th of March 1970

Translation of part of the Declaration issued  
by the Revolutionary Command Council, 11 March 1970

(The declaration begins with a long partisan review of the history of the Kurdish Question and lists ~~these~~ measures taken by the Ba'athist régime in the last eighteen months which, it claims, laid the foundation for the present agreement with the Kurds. What follows is a verbatim translation of the rest of the Declaration)

The Revolutionary Command Council initiated contacts with Mustafa al Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, which led to an exchange of views. Both sides became convinced of the necessity of accepting and implementing the contents of this declaration.

The Revolutionary Command Council re-affirms its determination to deepen and expand all effective measures to achieve cultural and economic development in the Kurdish area, seeking first of all to enable the Kurdish people to exercise their legitimate rights and to ensure that they participate in a practical way in the earnest endeavours to build a homeland and the struggle to fulfill its great national aims. The Revolutionary Command Council has therefore reached the following decisions:-





1. The Kurdish language shall be with Arabic the official language in areas populated by the Kurdish majority. The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. Arabic shall be taught in all schools where Kurdish is the language of instruction while Kurdish shall be taught in schools throughout the remainder of Iraq as a second language within the limits stipulated by law.

2. The participation of our Kurdish brothers in Government and non-discrimination between Kurds and others in filling public offices including sensitive and important posts in the State, such as cabinet portfolios, army command etc. These have been and will remain among the important objectives which the revolutionary Government seeks to achieve. In recognising this the revolutionary Government stresses the necessity of achieving an equitable ratio in such appointments with due regard to efficiency, the proportionate distribution of the Kurdish population and the iniquities which our Kurdish brothers have suffered in the past.

3. In view of the cultural and educational backwardness of the Kurdish population, a plan will be drawn up to make good this backwardness by:-

- (a) Hastening implementation of the resolutions of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning the language and cultural rights of the

/Kurdish





Kurdish people and delegating to the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and directing radio and television programmes on Kurdish national issues.

- (b) Reinstating, regardless of age, all students expelled or compelled to leave school because of the conflict in the area; failing reinstatement, to find appropriate solutions in individual cases.

- (c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area.

Raising the standard of education and admitting students to universities, military colleges, educational missions and scholarships in numbers proportionate to the Kurdish population.

4. In the administrative units in predominantly Kurdish areas officials shall be Kurds or persons competent in the Kurdish language provided that the required number is available. Principal officials (Governor, Qaimaqam, Director of Police, Director of Security, etc.) will be appointed and immediate action will be taken to set up Government machinery in the area in consultation with the High Committee established to supervise the implementation of this statement; this to be carried out in a manner which will strengthen national unity and the stability of the area.





5. The Government recognises the right of the Kurdish people to set up their own organisations for students, young people, women and teachers which will be affiliated to the corresponding Iraqi national organisations.

6. (a) The operative period of paragraphs 1 and 2 of R.C.C. decision number 39 of 5 August 1968 (Note: this granted amnesty to all those involved in the Kurdish fighting up to that date) shall be extended up to the date of issue of this statement and shall extend to all those who participated in the conflict in the Kurdish area.

(b) Workers, officials and employees, both civilian and military, shall return to service irrespective of establishment. Civilians may be employed in the Kurdish area according to requirements.

7. (a) A committee of experts shall be set up to supervise the general development of the Kurdish area and to arrange compensation for the setbacks of recent years. An adequate budget is to be allocated for this purpose. The committee in question shall come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Northern Affairs.

(b) The economic plan shall be drawn up to ensure balanced development throughout

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Iraq with due attention to the Kurdish area.

(c) Pensions shall be paid to the families of those members of the Kurdish armed movement and others martyred during the past regrettable hostilities; pensions will also be paid to those disabled or deformed as a result of the fighting. Special legislation will be enacted to implement this on the lines of the Laws currently in force.

(d) Immediate action will be taken to relieve hardship by implementing housing projects, providing appropriate aid in cash and in kind and by arranging through the High Committee for the appropriate compensation to those in need who are not covered by the provisions of the paragraphs above.

8. The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be restored to their former homes. The inhabitants of villages in areas not designated for habitation and which are taken over by the Government for public utility purposes under law shall be resettled in neighbouring areas and properly compensated.

9. The Agrarian Reform Law shall be quickly implemented in the Kurdish area and amended in such a way as to guarantee the end of the feudal system and the acquisition by the peasants of suitable plots of land. Taxes on such land

/which





which accumulated over the period of the conflict shall be waived.

10. It has been agreed that the Interim Constitution shall be amended as follows:

(a) The people of Iraq is made up of two principal nationalities. The Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity.

(b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article 4 of the Constitution:

"The Kurdish language shall be, with Arabic, the official language in the Kurdish area."

(c) The above will be incorporated into the permanent Constitution.

11. The (Kurdish) broadcasting station and heavy weapons shall be handed over to the Government. This to be done when the final stages of the agreement are implemented.

12. A Kurd shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Republic.

13. The Governorates Law shall be amended to conform with the substance of this statement.

14. Following the publication of this statement the necessary measures shall be taken in consultation with the High Committee supervising its implementation to unify the governorates and administrative units in areas

/populated





populated by a Kurdish majority; these areas to be decided by an official census yet to be carried out. The State shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the Kurdish people's exercise of all their national rights as a guarantee of their enjoying autonomy (al-hukm adh-dhati) within the wider national unity. Until this administrative unity is achieved Kurdish national affairs shall be co-ordinated by periodic meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As autonomy is to be achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic the exploitation of natural resources in the area will naturally fall under the jurisdiction of the Republican authorities.

15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a ratio corresponding with their proportion of the Iraqi population.

(The declaration concludes with general exhortations.)



Reydo  
PMM

8/4.

COVERING SECRET

M. Luard

~~the~~ ~~Salter~~

63

Mr. Arthur

KURDS

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 9 APR 1970 NEQ 1/2
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I attach a ~~draft~~ paper setting out Near Eastern Department's views on the 11 March "settlement" between the Iraq Government and the Barzanist Kurds, on the lines discussed on 1 April.

*S. L. Egerton*  
(S.L. Egerton)  
Near Eastern Department  
2 April, 1970.

c.c. PUSD (Assessment Staff)  
Arabian Dept.  
Research Dept.  
IRD  
NAD  
Defence Department

*E. A. ...*

The P.U.S. asked for something as then was.  
I sd. only like to add translations of two poems, one  
Arabic one Kurdish, which Sir Arnold Wilson prefaced  
to his chapter on Iraqi Kurdistan in "Loyalties" :-

" There are three plagues in his world - the Kurd,  
the rat and the locust "  
(Arabic rhyming poem)

" The camel is not an animal nor his Arab  
a human being "  
(Kurdish rhyming poem).

*E. A. ...*  
/I can... 84




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Mr. Baker

I can only add to this that Mr. Afshar tried to make my flesh creep about this settlement when we had lunch the other day. He suggested that the sinister influence of the Soviet Union was behind the settlement: ought we not therefore to look at it with great suspicion etc.

2. No doubt the settlement does suit the Soviet book and they may well have had a hand in it. But the real point is well put in paragraph 7 of the submission. The Iraqis can usually be relied on to throw away any advantages they may have gained by their inept follow-up action. On past form I would not expect this settlement to stick for very long.



(P.T. Hayman)  
3 April, 1970.

I hope ~~the Dept~~ <sup>the Dept</sup> are not being over-optimistic about the Iraqis' ability to defeat themselves. The outcome of this settlement could in certain circumstances be v. serious for us in the context of both the Gulf and the Arab/Israel dispute

Mr. Luard.

→ Mr. Heichl  
COVERING SECRET 8/4

Mr. Greenleaf  
6/4 527/4



SECRET

IRAQ: ANNOUNCED SETTLEMENT WITH THE KURDS

On 11 March, 1970 the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council announced the "complete and constitutional settlement of the Kurdish issue". This followed three months of negotiations in Baghdad during which time the Soviet Government seems to have exerted considerable pressure on both sides to settle their differences. The Fifteen Point Agreement, which has been confirmed by Kurdish leaders, is given in full in the Research Department Memorandum at Appendix A, which also compares the new agreement with the abortive settlement of 1966. This is being printed. Both agreements have many points in common.

2. The main points of the published Agreement of 11 March are:-

- (a) The Iraq Government has declared its intention to develop the administrative unity of the Kurdish area and to give the Kurds a measure of autonomy in it.
- (b) The Kurds are to have an "equitable share" of public office, including a Kurdish Vice President, official posts and senior Army appointments.
- (c) There are to be Kurdish representatives in the legislature (which is as yet non-existent) in proportion to their percentage of the total population.
- (d) Kurdish officials are to operate in predominantly Kurdish areas.
- (e) The Iraq Government will provide relief measures and economic aid in the war-damaged areas of Northern Iraq.

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- 2 -

3. We know from reliable sources that there are some secret clauses to the agreement as follows:-

- (i) A joint committee will be set up to supervise implementation of the whole agreement in consultation with both parties.
- (ii) One of the tasks of the joint committee would be to reduce the number of the Kurdish regular force, if possible, to 6,000 men. During the period of resettlement, which will be in five unspecified stages, the Iraq Government will pay for the general upkeep of the force.
- (iii) The Iraq Government will disarm and disband all Kurdish forces opposed to the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, and the Iraqi armed forces are to be withdrawn to their "normal positions".
- (iv) The Kurdish Democratic Party is to be allowed to operate freely in the Kurdish region and to publish its own newspaper.
- (v) All persons formerly in Iraqi Government service who joined in the Kurdish rebellion will be permitted to resume their employment without loss of seniority. Those who served with the Kurdish regulars (the Pish Merga) are to be permitted to count their service with the Kurds as if they had served in Iraqi Armed Forces.
- (vi) A nation-wide census will take place within one year to define the region of Kurdish majority.
- (vii) Although the Iraqi national flag will not be altered specially to incorporate a Kurdish symbol straightaway, this will be done as and when the national flag is changed.

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- 3 -

4. Since the announcement of the agreement, both the Iraqi Government and the Kurds have been at pains to emphasise their determination to make it stick. On 31 March, as part of a Government reshuffle, five Kurds were appointed to Ministries - including Agriculture, Works and Housing, and the Development of the North. Despite this moderately promising start (Cabinet posts as such are not of much account in present-day Iraq), we believe that the chances of this agreement developing into a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem are slightly less than evens. There are important obscurities in the publicised agreement which are not clarified in the secret annex. These include the precise extent of the Kurdish autonomous area, the exact meaning of the word "autonomy", and the amount to be allocated by the Iraqi Government for the development of the Kurdish region. All these points will cause difficulty from the start and if they are to be seriously gone into will require a further period of tough negotiation. There is no evidence yet that the Iraq Government is ready to undertake this. The Kurds, on the other hand, need a respite from the war but have no reason to trust any Iraq Government, given the past history of relations between them. They will certainly not agree to the final disbanding of the Pish Merga and the surrender of their heavy weapons and wireless station until they have seen the colour of Ba'athi money and substantial progress towards clarification of obscure points in the Agreement.

5. We know that the agreement has caused the Shah concern since he feels that, if successfully implemented, it will free the

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hands of the Ba'ath Government to cause trouble for Kuwait and in the Gulf generally. He may also fear that with their own Kurds more or less under control, the Iraqis may wish to try and subvert those on the Iranian side of the frontier and will be generally freer to try to cause trouble within Iran - for instance in Khuzistan, where there is an Arab population thought to be about three millions. Accordingly the Shah can be counted on to step up his activities within Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to subvert the agreement. This could be the decisive factor if, as seems likely, negotiations on the more delicate issues run into difficulties. The Israelis can be counted on to assist the Persians in this exercise financially and perhaps by increased liaison with Savak etc.

6. If the agreement is eventually successfully implemented there will be scope for the redeployment of some of the Iraqi forces (up to four divisions) at present tied up in the North. There have been indications of the Government's intention to deploy more troops both in Jordan and on the south eastern frontier with Iran but to date, as far as is known, only one battalion has moved from Kurdistan (to Jordan), and it seems improbable that any large scale movements will be made until more progress has been made on implementation. If and when the situation allows such movements, it is probable that a considerable portion of the forces released would go to Jordan to supplement the 15,000 or so Iraqis there at present. The Iraqis have not been notable for any effective show of aggression against Israel, and we would judge that the reinforcement of their contingent in Jordan would be largely for presentational reasons. It is also likely that

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some troops would be posted south to "confront" Iran across the Shatt al Arab. These too would have a largely presentational role, though their presence would to some extent increase tension along the southern part of the Iraq/Iran frontier. It would also increase jitteriness in Kuwait, though we do not consider that the Iraqis have, at present, any aggressive intentions against Kuwait despite heavy Ba'athist hints (not made in public) that they "have Kuwait more or less in their pocket".

7. Unemployed Iraqi hands generally turn to mischief; but the Iraqi's ability to promote mischief outside their own country has fortunately been limited by their inept diplomacy, administrative incompetence and ill-judged timing. Stalemate in Kurdistan suited nearly everybody (except the combatants) very well. It is hard not to see the prospect of peace as a theoretical threat, but the Iraqis can usually be relied on to defeat themselves.

Near Eastern Department

2 April, 1970.

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The Kurdish Settlement: comparisons between  
the 1965 and 1970 Proposals

Introductory Background

When Dr. Abdel Rahman Bazzaz became Prime Minister of Iraq in 1965 the Kurdish war had been in progress for some five years, and it was one of his main objectives to bring it to a close as soon as possible. He was unable to take the initiative, however, until after the failure of yet another attempt by the Iraqi army to crush the rebels in the spring of 1966, and it was not until early in June that contacts were made with Barzani and that conditions favourable to talks were established. There were then a number of visits by delegations in which views were exchanged, and finally Barzani sent a message to the Prime Minister in which he indicated a wish to come to terms. Dr. Bazzaz responded by broadcasting on 29 June a programme for "restoration of normal conditions in northern Iraq" which he summarised in twelve main headings (the Twelve Points).

The impression created by his declaration was that it was a blueprint for an eventual settlement rather than a settlement in itself, that much of its phraseology was ambiguous and that a great deal had been left unsaid. It was felt, nevertheless, that as long as Bazzaz remained in office there was a fair chance of progress, and the Kurds seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the proposals which Barzani welcomed as contributing towards the achievement of peace. By mid-July, however, a reaction had set in, and the Kurds were becoming increasingly disillusioned by lack of any positive signs of implementation, and when Bazzaz was dismissed on 6 August



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hopes of a settlement virtually disappeared. The Kurds accused the Government of having gone back on the Basma proposals, difficulties appeared in the reinstatement of Kurdish officers, and the Government dragged its feet over Kurdish local government while for its part suspecting that Basmaji was not playing straight over surrender of war material, particularly that captured from the Iraqi army. By October there was a stalemate with no further progress likely. Neither side trusted the other and both made frequent allegations of bad faith by the other. Thereafter the position deteriorated steadily with a gradual relapse into further hostilities. Renewed fighting on a considerable scale was reported in January 1967.

The war continued inconclusively into 1970, early in which year it was reported that new contacts had been made with the Kurds in an attempt to reach a settlement. It was known that the Government was increasingly concerned about the morale of the large forces tied down in the north, at the ever increasing expense of the war, and the apparent inability of the Army to force a decision. It was believed, however, that these attempts had been unsuccessful, and the announcement of a settlement on 11 March came as something of a surprise. The proposals published by the Government on 12 March follow those of 1966 fairly closely. Once again a blueprint has been produced; it remains to be seen whether present conditions are more favourable to its implementation than those of 1966.



## **2. The Demands**

**1970**

### **The Published Terms**

- 1. Kurdish language recognised officially on a parity with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority.**
- 2. Acceptance of Kurdish participation in the Government and in all Government departments without discrimination. Officials in Kurdish areas to be Kurds or Kurdish speaking.**
- 3. Educational and cultural services for Kurds to be implemented and expanded.**
- 4. Right of the Kurds to have their own "popular organisations".**
- 5. Reinstatement of all former Kurdish military and civil officials, students and workers.**
- 6. Establishment of a Kurdish development commission with an adequate budget.**

**1966**

### **Abdul Rahman Hassan's Twelve Points**

**Kurdish to be recognised as an official language side by side with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority, and with Arabic as the language of instruction in these areas. (Paragraph 3.)**

**All public offices and appointments open to Kurds on a proportional basis including ministerial, judicial, military and diplomatic posts. (Paragraph 5.)**  
**Local officials to be Kurds if sufficient available. (Paragraph 7.)**

**Kurds to have a fair share of educational grants etc. University of Baghdad to give facilities for study of Kurdish literature, language, etc. (Paragraph 6.)**  
**Minister to be appointed for supervision of rehabilitation with control of administrative, linguistic and cultural affairs affecting the Kurds. (Paragraph 11.)**

**On return of parliamentary life a measure of freedom of expression and political organisation to be permitted within the law. (Paragraph 8.)**

**On termination of hostilities and acts of violence all Kurdish officials and employees to be reinstated in their former posts, including also dismissed workers. (Paragraph 9.)**

**A special body, answerable to a Minister, to carry out rehabilitation and development, including tourism, tobacco growing and afforestation. (Paragraph 11.)**



7. Preparation of a special economic plan for the Kurdish region.
8. Rehabilitation of Kurds and Arabs driven out or affected by hostilities. Relief measures for housing and employment to be put in hand.
9. The agrarian reform law to be speeded up in Kurdish areas.
10. Amendment of the interim constitution to confirm the existence of two basic nationalities, Arab and Kurd.
11. Appointment of a Kurd as one of the V/Presidents.
12. Measures to be taken to secure Kurdish national rights and autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic.
13. The exploitation of national wealth in the autonomous area to be the responsibility of the Republican authority.
14. Kurds to have representation in the legislature in ratio to the population figures.
15. The Kurdish broadcasting station and all heavy weapons to be surrendered.

-

Funds now being spent on the war to be devoted to Kurdish rehabilitation. (Paragraph 11.)

The Government will endeavour to rehabilitate all individuals and groups in their former places of habitation with a return to the status quo ante as far as possible. (Paragraph 12.)

-

Kurdish nationality is recognised by the interim constitution, but to be re-emphasised in the forthcoming permanent constitution. Recognises two main nationalities with equal rights and obligations. (Paragraph 1.)

-

Recognition of Kurdish rights by decentralisation to administrative units with wide powers in local and municipal affairs through elected assemblies. (Paragraph 2.)

-

Kurds to be represented in the National Assembly on a proportional basis as defined in the new electoral law. (Paragraph 4.)

All members of the armed forces and police to report to their units. Other armed bodies will be considered as under Government authority and will hand in their weapons in the course of rehabilitation. (Paragraph 10.)



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**3. Comment**

Of the fifteen clauses in the 1970 proposals eleven are repetitions, in slightly different form or with slightly different emphasis, of those of 1966 (see Annex). It is reported, however, that the Kurds are satisfied that they are an improvement on 1966, and Barzani is on record as having said that they had secured all their demands saving only their own flag, a fixed share of the oil revenues and representation on the Revolutionary Command Council. He is said also to be hoping for at least four Ministries in a reconstituted Government. It is possible also that there has been agreement on measures not made public, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Iraqi troops, the retention of the Pesh Merga as a National Guard in the Kurdish areas and the abandonment by the Government of support for Talabani and his followers.

The 1970 proposals do appear to be less vague and rather clearer cut than those of 1966, though there is still much in them which is ambiguous. They contain also four clauses which are not in Barzani's Twelve Points. Of these that on the exploitation of national wealth makes it clear that the Kurds are not to enjoy the exclusive benefits of oil exploitation in Kurdish areas; the others, dealing with an economic plan, agrarian reform and appointment of a Kurdish V/President do not add up to any great advance on 1970 from the Kurdish point of view. The gain from the latter appointment is likely to be more prestigious than real, agrarian reform has never been an important issue in northern Iraq, and the economic plan will depend entirely on allocation of funds and executive staff.



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The most important clause is that (No. 12) in which the Kurds are to be granted autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, which appears to make possible the eventual establishment of autonomous areas under Kurdish local administration, thereby satisfying the Kurdish demand for a separate Kurdish province.

#### **4. Conclusion**

It now remains to be seen whether the agreement can be implemented, or whether, as in 1966, inaction, mistrust and different interpretation of imprecise phraseology will lead to gradual failure. Much will depend upon the real inclination of both sides to reach a lasting settlement, on how far the Iranians are prepared to allow this to happen, and on how much confidence the two sides have in each other's good faith. The RCC appear to be more strongly based than Bassas in 1966, and so the situation following the latter's fall is perhaps unlikely to be repeated at least exactly in the same way. The Ba'ath, however, and its ruling clique the RCC, are both exclusive organisations unwilling either to share or relinquish power to any extent, and it is therefore a most question whether the Kurds will succeed in obtaining the full autonomy and degree of equality which the agreement appears to promise them.

Middle East Section  
Research Department  
20 March 1970

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ANNEX

Analysis of the 1970 Proposals

1. Language. No change: almost identical with 1966.
2. Participation in the Government. Much the same. The present proposals are slightly more precise.
3. Education and Culture. Much the same; if anything the 1966 version is the more comprehensive and rather less vague.
4. Popular Organizations. No change.
5. Reinstatement of Officials, etc. Much the same.
6. Development Commission. No great difference: the 1970 commission appears to have been given rather greater powers than that proposed in 1966.
7. Economic Plan. Not in the 1966 proposals.
8. Rehabilitation. No change, other than specific mention of Arab as well as Kurdish displacement.
9. Agrarian Reform. Not in the 1966 proposals.
10. Recognition of Kurdish nationality. No change.
11. Appointment of a V/President. Not in the 1966 proposals.
12. Kurdish Autonomy. The 1970 phraseology is more definite and precise than that of 1966. Autonomy is recognised in a fuller and wider sense.
13. Exploitation of national wealth. Not in the 1966 proposals. Has evident reference to oil wealth, and on this the Government has won its point.
14. Representation. No change.
15. Surrender of heavy weapons, etc. Roughly comparable with point 10 in 1966.

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**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

**DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 234/70**

**NEQ 1/2**

*General Distribution*

**IRAQ**

**2 April, 1970**

**THE BA'ATHIST GOVERNMENT'S SETTLEMENT WITH THE KURDS**

*The British Ambassador in Iraq to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
(Received 2 April)*

**SUMMARY**

Both parties declare the settlement announced on 11 March to be final. (Paragraph 1.)

2. The Ba'athist régime took some time to evolve a more positive approach to the Kurdish problem than their sundry predecessors over the 10 years of intermittent fighting. (Paragraph 2.)

3. Negotiations began in earnest late in 1969 and ran into the expected difficulties, but breakdown was avoided by the two leading figures accepting an incomplete compromise. (Paragraphs 3-4.)

4. The outcome, which was formally not an Agreement but a Declaration by the RCC, deals adequately with the easier problems but is obscure on the major ones, such as the sharing of power at the centre, the future of Barzani's 20,000 irregulars, the disposal of the rival Talabanist partisans, the meaning of "autonomy" and the future status of the Kurdish Democratic Party and of Barzani himself, its chairman. There is very probably an unpublished protocol. (Paragraphs 5-7.)

5. Implementation is entrusted formally to a Joint Committee (whose membership is unimpressive) but the gradual removal of mutual distrust is the greater problem. (Paragraph 8.)

6. The Soviet Government certainly played a role in the settlement but its extent is uncertain. (Paragraph 9.)

7. If the pacification of the Kurds proves effective, where will the Ba'athists direct the nervous energy released? Reinforcement of the "Eastern Command"? Trouble-making in Persian Kurdistan? Kuwait? Or just general preparation for the future confrontation with Iran in the Gulf? (Paragraphs 10-12.)

8. They ought of course to use the opportunity to cultivate their own garden, the Kurdish kailyard in particular. But will they? Increased internal self-confidence should have at least some beneficial consequences. (Paragraphs 13-14.)

9. On balance, the settlement is probably a good thing for all of us—if it sticks. (Paragraph 15.)

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(Confidential)

Baghdad,

Sir,

27 March, 1970.

As already reported by telegram, the Iraqi Government and the Kurds of Iraq led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani state that the Revolutionary Command Council's declaration of 11 March represents the achievement of a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem and has put an end to the Kurdish revolt against the Central Government which has gone on spasmodically since 1961. In this despatch I have the honour to submit some observations on the nature of this settlement, on the likelihood of its effective implementation, and on its implications for Iraq's policies elsewhere.

2. The Ba'athist Government, which came to power in July 1968, did not for some time show any sign of having better ideas on how to deal with the Kurds than those they had when they were previously in power in 1963 or those which other Iraqi Governments had applied in the interim. In brief, these were to contain so far as they were able the extent of the area controlled by the Kurds under Mullah Mustafa Barzani and therefore outside the control of the Government in Baghdad, and to weaken him by a combination of military and political pressure exerted latterly through his Kurdish rival, Jalal Talabani, whom the Government supported with money and arms. More recently, however, the Government gave effect to certain of the proposals for the settlement of the problem which were put forward by Abdul Rahman al Bazzaz when he was Prime Minister in 1966. Thus a university was established in Sulaimaniya, a Kurdish Academy of Letters was set up, Kurdish was made the language of instruction in schools in the Kurdish area, an amnesty was declared for those who had taken part in the fighting and a measure of decentralisation of power to the Governorates was introduced. In spite of these propitiatory gestures sporadic clashes continued throughout 1969 and, when in January 1970 it became apparent that serious negotiations were taking place between the Ba'athists and representatives of Mullah Mustafa under cover of a *de facto* cease-fire, there was considerable scepticism, even incredulity, that the two sides could overcome their distrust and antipathy sufficiently to try to reach a settlement of the many difficult issues between them.

3. Little is known of the course of the negotiations. It seems that the initiative came from the Ba'athists and that initial contacts were made in late 1969 in Beirut and in the Kurdish area where emissaries were sent from Baghdad to persuade the Barzanists that the Government were acting in good faith and genuinely sought a peaceful settlement. Discussions took place in January and February; on the Government side Saddam Hussein al Tikriti, Hardan al Tikriti, Saleh Mehdi Ammash and Murtadha al Hadithi are those names most frequently mentioned as having taken part; Mahmoud Othman, Muhsin Dizaie, Shawkat Akrawi, Ihsan Shirzad and Saleh Yusefi were among those representing the Kurds.

4. The points on which it was particularly difficult to reach agreement included, as was to be expected, the extent to which the Kurds were to share in the formulation of policy and in the exercise of power at the national level, the physical extent of the predominantly Kurdish area and, in particular, whether it included the town of Kirkuk and the nearby oilfields, the degree of autonomy to be given to the Kurdish area and its share of State revenues, the amount to be allocated for the economic development of the area, the future of the Pish Merga (Barzani's armed forces) and Barzani's reputed insistence on some sort of outside guarantee. The talks seemed close to breakdown more than once, and were probably saved by the determination of Saddam Hussein on the one hand and by Barzani's realisation on the other that he would lose little (save Iranian subventions) by taking the best he could get and giving it a try. And he is of course getting old.



5. The outcome of the negotiations was the issue of a declaration by the Revolutionary Command Council on 11 March which recorded various decisions which the RCC had made; simultaneously a telegram from Barzani supporting and welcoming the declaration was released. (It will be noted that the published settlement does not take the form of an "Agreement"—which would be hardly proper for a sovereign Government dealing with a group of its rebellious subjects—but Barzani's signature on a document of some kind was no doubt secured.) The announcement was the occasion for mammoth celebrations in Baghdad. (In Mosul, by contrast, where I happened to be at the time and which has Talabanist connections, the rejoicings were noticeably perfunctory.) A three-day public holiday was declared, the third coinciding with the Kurdish New Year.

6. The text of the RCC's Declaration (a translation of the substantive part of which is enclosed) reflects the difficulties of reaching agreement on the more important issues. It is reasonably specific on questions of an amnesty, the use of Kurdish as an official language and as the language of instruction in predominantly Kurdish areas, the principles of appointing Kurds in an equitable proportion to the highest Government posts (including one of the Vice-Presidencies and what is referred to as the Legislature) and of appointing Kurdish or Kurdish-speaking officials to posts in Kurdish areas, the provision of pensions to the families of Kurds killed in the fighting, the return of Arabs and Kurds to their villages or their resettlement and other measures of rehabilitation. The RCC have also committed themselves to unifying the administration of the area in which Kurds are predominant and in which they will exercise their national rights and enjoy "autonomy". The definition of this area will be made "on the basis of a census yet to be taken"—a formula evidently designed to overcome the obstacle presented by the Government's refusal to concede the inclusion of Kirkuk in the Kurdish area and by the Kurds' refusal to accept the accuracy of existing statistics on the distribution of population. (How many Kurds displaced in the past from the Kirkuk area will, one wonders, be returned there before the census?) Responsibility for the exploitation of natural resources in the Kurdish area remains significantly the responsibility of the central authorities. In return economic planning is to "assure equal development for the various parts of Iraq".

7. But on a number of the crucial issues, such as those listed in paragraph 4, the declaration is at least obscure. The omissions lend some colour to the rumours of a "secret protocol" dealing with other matters—conditionally, it may be, on progress being made with the implementation of the published understanding, in much the same way as Barzani's surrender of broadcasting equipment and heavy weapons is already declared conditional. Amongst the more obvious obscurities are:

(a) The method by which the Kurds are to share in legislative power, at present a jealously guarded Ba'athist monopoly. Vague stories of an undertaking by the Government to set up an elected National Council, on which the Kurds and other minorities would be represented, ring rather hollow—though Barzani's spokesman, Mahmoud Othman, has subsequently been quoted as saying that agreement on this question is expected to be reached within two or three months. The allocation of five Ministries, for which Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party is said to be choosing nominees in a month or two, will give them (since Ministers as such are scarcely more than high-level executives) no share in the policy-making process.

(b) The future of the Pish Merga, who are said to number over 20,000. Without some kind of outside guarantee Barzani would not be fool



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enough to disarm. The declaration does not call upon him to surrender small arms (even conditionally, as in the case of heavy weapons) or to disband his army. It had been expected that the latter would be reconstituted as frontier guards in the Kurdish region under at least nominal Government control. Both Saddam Hussein and Mahmoud Othman have since been quoted by the Press as saying that the Pish Merga would "become part of the Iraqi Army"; but such statements hardly do more than draw attention to the silence of the published settlement on the subject.

- (c) The disposal of Talabani's anti-Barzani irregulars, the Fursan Salahuddin. Indeed the declaration is conspicuously silent on the whole question of Talabani. We have had eye-witness reports of old scores being settled in the north with his supporters following the declaration. Talabani himself, despite the fact that a fulsome telegram of support from him was published in the Press on 15 March, is said to have gone to Switzerland. It may be that the Government has simply left his partisans to make whatever accommodation they can with the new circumstances. The only reference I have seen to the Fursan in the local Press disposes of the problem by declaring that they will be sent to fight the Israelis.
- (d) The meaning of "autonomy". The word, or its rough Arabic equivalent (al-hukm adh-dhati) figures only in one passage in the declaration (Article 14), and is hardly applicable to the modest degree of regional self-administration envisaged. There is clearly plenty of scope for future misunderstandings in this field, as in others.
- (e) The future of the KDP and of its chairman, Mullah Mustafa. Although the publicity media have been emphasising *ad nauseam* the identity of views of the KDP and the Ba'ath on Palestine and on the usual revolutionary themes, there is no reference to the future of the party, or its place within the body politic, in the declaration itself. Presumably the Government's intention, despite token gestures of recognition, is to limit the activities of the party, unless it can be safely Ba'athised, to the Kurdish area. Meanwhile the KDP have announced their intention of holding a Party Congress in May or June.

8. How is the settlement to be implemented? In terms of formal machinery (though the gradual establishment of mutual confidence is the real and much harder requirement) there are references in the declaration to the appointment of a Higher Committee to supervise implementation. Its powers and composition are not there defined. The appointment of a "Peace Committee", subsequently revealed to be the Higher Committee under another name, was announced on 18 March. Its chairman is Murtadha al Hadithi: and it includes a second (military) member of the RCC, General Sa'adun Ghaidan. Aziz Sherif, the Communist Minister of Justice, is on it, as are the (existing) Governors of Arbil and Kirkuk. The remaining four members are Kurds; two are described as members of the Political Bureau of the KDP and the other two as members of the Executive Bureau. Both the latter are known to us as erstwhile visitors to the Soviet bloc.

9. This brings me to the part presumably played by the Soviet Union in promoting the settlement. No one doubts that the Russians have been active behind the scenes: but they have been careful not to take any public credit, and the extent of their supposed involvement may possibly be exaggerated. Neither the Ba'ath nor Barzani are conspicuously responsive to outside dictation. On the other hand it is common knowledge that the continuance of the Kurdish dispute

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has long been a subject of reproof in Russian dealings with the Ba'ath. And some of the Kurds who have played a leading part in the negotiations are notoriously far to the Left.

10. Assuming that the agreement, with or without an element of Soviet supervision, proves sufficiently effective and lasting to enable the régime to turn its attentions elsewhere, where will it turn them? The Government, echoed by the Kurds themselves, has of course announced that the settlement will enable Iraq to concentrate its attention, and more of its armed forces, on the Israeli front. And no doubt King Hussein and everyone else must reckon with at least some Iraqi reinforcement of the Eastern Command, if and when the pacification of the north makes substantial redeployment possible.

11. What about other Iraqi "fronts"? Inevitably there have been rumours that the opportunity would be taken to foment demands for similar "autonomy" amongst the Kurds of Iran and Turkey. Indeed General Ammash is said to have given the Turks a (perhaps jocular) warning to that effect when he visited Ankara in January. On 16 March the Iraq News Agency attributed to Barzani himself a curiously equivocal statement that "although the Kurdish movement of Iran has no organisational relationship with the KDP of Iraq, none the less the Kurdish people as a whole, like other peoples struggling for their national rights, must assert its freedom". But this apart—and despite the Ba'ath's undoubted desire to repay the Shah in his own coin—Barzani has wisely shown no sign of wishing to give greater offence to the Shah than he has already done by accepting the settlement.

12. Further down the frontier with Iran we have no evidence of any significant reinforcement of Iraqi troops since 11 March. It remains my view that the Iraqis have no more desire than the Iranians to push the propaganda war over the Shatt-al-Arab any nearer to active hostilities. It is certainly true, however, that one of the Iraqis' prime motives in pacifying the Kurds is to free themselves in the longer term for their future confrontation with Iran in the Persian Gulf. Whatever views the Iranians for their part may hold of the increased threat from Iraq, there is little doubt that the settlement is unwelcome to Kuwait. There have already been indications from secret sources that the Government of Iraq may once more be turning a covetous eye in that direction. (Parenthetically I would add that a disruptive collision with the Iraq Petroleum Company, which seems increasingly possible, might well drive the Iraqis into a southern adventure.)

13. In theory, of course, it is not towards new foreign adventures anywhere but to the development of the Kurdish area itself that the régime should bend the energies and resources released by the settlement. And it is a fair assumption that this is what the Kurds will press for. One Iraqi in five, after all, is a Kurd; and the centre of gravity in a unified Iraq ought therefore to move metaphorically northwards. But this assumes that the Kurds, armed with the promise of a fair share in the machinery of government, will be able to exert effective pressure on the riverain Sunni Arabs who, under the present as under every past régime, govern Iraq. Hopes have already been expressed in some quarters that Kurdish participation in government will indeed have a restricting effect on the wild men of the Ba'ath, and persuade them to concentrate on cultivating their own back garden. I hesitate to share these hopes.

14. As for other internal considerations, there can be no doubt that the Government expect their credibility in public eyes to be materially enhanced by the settlement—though there must be some in the higher ranks of the army, particularly those who have been making a good thing out of the war, who resent it. The Government will certainly seek to use the settlement to impose their



social policies in Barzani's not conspicuously Socialist domain and to push ahead with them more vigorously elsewhere. If their self-confidence is reinforced by bringing off the settlement, one must hope that this will encourage some degree of relaxation in the nervous intolerance of their political behaviour.

15. All in all, and despite the risks presented by the redirection of the Government's energies to other fields, the settlement (if it sticks) is probably a good thing for all of us. But there is a long way to go before anyone can tell whether it has a chance of permanence or whether history will reveal it as just another fruitless pause in the long Kurdish struggle for a national identity.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Jedda, Tripoli, Ankara, Tehran, Moscow and Washington and to the Political Resident, Bahrain, the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York, and the United Kingdom delegation to NATO, Brussels.

I have, etc.,

H. G. BALFOUR PAUL.

**Enclosure**

**TRANSLATION OF PART OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE  
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL, 11 MARCH, 1970**

(The declaration begins with a long partisan review of the history of the Kurdish question and lists those measures taken by the Ba'athist régime in the last 18 months which, it claims, laid the foundation for the present agreement with the Kurds. What follows is a verbatim translation of the rest of the declaration.)

The Revolutionary Command Council initiated contacts with Mustafa al Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, which led to an exchange of views. Both sides became convinced of the necessity of accepting and implementing the contents of this declaration.

The Revolutionary Command Council reaffirms its determination to deepen and expand all effective measures to achieve cultural and economic development in the Kurdish area, seeking first of all to enable the Kurdish people to exercise their legitimate rights and to ensure that they participate in a practical way in the earnest endeavours to build a homeland and the struggle to fulfil its great national aims. The Revolutionary Command Council has therefore reached the following decisions:

1. The Kurdish language shall be with Arabic the official language in areas populated by the Kurdish majority. The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. Arabic shall be taught in all schools where Kurdish is the language of instruction while Kurdish shall be taught in schools throughout the remainder of Iraq as a second language within the limits stipulated by law.

2. The participation of our Kurdish brothers in Government and non-discrimination between Kurds and others in filling public offices including sensitive and important posts in the State, such as Cabinet Portfolios, Army Command, etc. These have been and will remain among the important objectives which the revolutionary Government seeks to achieve. In recognising this the revolutionary Government stresses the necessity of achieving an equitable ratio



in such appointments with due regard to efficiency, the proportionate distribution of the Kurdish population and the iniquities which our Kurdish brothers have suffered in the past.

3. In view of the cultural and educational backwardness of the Kurdish population, a plan will be drawn up to make good this backwardness by:

- (a) Hastening implementation of the resolutions of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning the language and cultural rights of the Kurdish people and delegating to the Directorate-General of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and directing radio and television programmes on Kurdish national issues.
- (b) Reinstating, regardless of age, all students expelled or compelled to leave school because of the conflict in the area; failing reinstatement, to find appropriate solutions in individual cases.
- (c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area. Raising the standard of education and admitting students to universities, military colleges, educational missions and scholarships in numbers proportionate to the Kurdish population.

4. In the administrative units in predominantly Kurdish areas officials shall be Kurds or persons competent in the Kurdish language provided that the required number is available. Principal officials (Governor, Qaimaqam, Director of Police, Director of Security, etc.), will be appointed and immediate action will be taken to set up Government machinery in the area in consultation with the High Committee established to supervise the implementation of this statement; this to be carried out in a manner which will strengthen national unity and the stability of the area.

5. The Government recognises the right of the Kurdish people to set up their own organisations for students, young people, women and teachers which will be affiliated to the corresponding Iraqi national organisations.

- 6. (a) The operative period of paragraphs 1 and 2 of RCC decision No. 39 of 5 August, 1968 (this granted amnesty to all those involved in the Kurdish fighting up to that date) shall be extended up to the date of issue of this statement and shall extend to all those who participated in the conflict in the Kurdish area.
- (b) Workers, officials and employees, both civilian and military, shall return to service irrespective of establishment. Civilians may be employed in the Kurdish area according to requirements.
- 7. (a) A committee of experts shall be set up to supervise the general development of the Kurdish area and to arrange compensation for the setbacks of recent years. An adequate budget is to be allocated for this purpose. The committee in question shall come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Northern Affairs.
- (b) The economic plan shall be drawn up to ensure balanced development throughout Iraq with due attention to the Kurdish area.
- (c) Pensions shall be paid to the families of those members of the Kurdish armed movement and others martyred during the past regrettable hostilities; pensions will also be paid to those disabled or deformed as a result of the fighting. Special legislation will be enacted to implement this on the lines of the laws currently in force.



- (d) Immediate action will be taken to relieve hardship by implementing housing projects, providing appropriate aid in cash and in kind and by arranging through the High Committee for the appropriate compensation to those in need who are not covered by the provisions of the paragraphs above.

8. The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be restored to their former homes. The inhabitants of villages in areas not designated for habitation and which are taken over by the Government for public utility purposes under law shall be resettled in neighbouring areas and properly compensated.

9. The Agrarian Reform Law shall be quickly implemented in the Kurdish area and amended in such a way as to guarantee the end of the feudal system and the acquisition by the peasants of suitable plots of land. Taxes on such land which accumulated over the period of the conflict shall be waived.

10. It has been agreed that the Interim Constitution shall be amended as follows:

(a) The people of Iraq is made up of two principal nationalities. The Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity.

(b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article 4 of the Constitution:  
"The Kurdish language shall be, with Arabic, the official language in the Kurdish area."

(c) The above will be incorporated into the permanent Constitution.

11. The (Kurdish) broadcasting station and heavy weapons shall be handed over to the Government. This to be done when the final stages of the agreement are implemented.

12. A Kurd shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Republic.

13. The Governorates Law shall be amended to conform with the substance of this statement.

14. Following the publication of this statement the necessary measures shall be taken in consultation with the High Committee supervising its implementation to unify the governorates and administrative units in areas populated by a Kurdish majority; these areas to be decided by an official census yet to be carried out. The State shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the Kurdish people's exercise of all their national rights as a guarantee of their enjoying autonomy (al-hukm adh-dhati) within the wider national unity. Until this administrative unity is achieved Kurdish national affairs shall be co-ordinated by periodic meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As autonomy is to be achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic the exploitation of natural resources in the area will naturally fall under the jurisdiction of the Republican authorities.

15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a ratio corresponding with their proportion of the Iraqi population.

(The declaration concludes with general exhortations.)




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*Mr. Hutchings*  
*R. G. Short*  
*31/3*


*PUMM*  
*14/4*



BRITISH EMBASSY, 6/3.

ANKARA.

25 March, 1970



18/6

Dear Robin,

Agreement Between the Kurds and the Iraq Government

Would you please refer to Baghdad telegrams on this subject, the latest received here being No. 207 of 13 March. We have not specifically reported on the Kurds in Turkey since John Dodds' letter of 14 October 1968 to Mick O'Brien, and between then and now the Turkish Government's policy of holding publicity about the Kurds to a minimum has been, on the whole, successful. But the recent agreement reached between Barzani and the Iraqi Government has given rise to a certain amount of local comment, although it is perhaps significant that most of this was not published until a week after the news of the agreement broke. The agreement itself was barely reported in the Turkish press.

2. Commentary has tended to be cautious. It has been pointed out that Turkey will benefit from the agreement in at least one sense: there should be, anyway for the moment, more peace and quiet on her south-eastern border, where over the years the Iraqis have accidentally dropped bombs intended for their own Kurdish rebels. But other commentators have spoken of the dangers inherent to Turkish stability in the agreement. Barzani has been quoted as looking forward to the day when there would be unity and freedom for all Kurds; and there has been speculation that, now that the Iraqi Government may be able to use Barzani against Iran (in the way Iran is said to have used Barzani against Iraq), Turkey is exposed to a similar danger. There has also been a reference to the troubles which Atatürk had with the Kurds, when "foreign forces" were prepared to interfere in Turkey's affairs, and a warning that Turkey should be aware of this danger too. Comments have been inter-mingled with scepticism that this agreement with the Kurds has a chance of proving to be "final".

3. Not unnaturally there has been no official reaction to the agreement; but there is a feeling that the majority of the Kurds in Turkey are no longer potentially subversive, and it would not be surprising if the Turkish Government is taking a relaxed attitude in present circumstances. Furthermore, while the Iraqi Government may be glad of another sensitive point for the Iranians, subversive activities against Turkey would be something else. The militant Arab countries tend to curry Turkey's favour on the Arab/Israeli issue. In this context the President of Iraq's statement, reported in the Turkish press on 23 March, that Iraq fully supported Turkey on the Cyprus problem, and was pleased with Turkey's policy over Palestine, is interesting.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*R. G. Short*  
(R.G. Short)

P.R. Fearn, Esq.,  
Southern European Dept.,  
F.C.O.

c.c. Chancery: BAGHDAD TEHRAN Consulate General, ISTANBUL.



RESTRICTED

65



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION

Alexander Pallis Street, NICOSIA

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 6 APR 1970 N2Q 1/2
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1 April, 1970

Mr. H. H. H. (NED)

Your brief for the 1st of 1 gave a useful summary but is probably insufficiently detailed on the nature of the and steps leading up to the agreement. Have you a more comprehensive background paper for Nicosia?

1st June 6/4

Inspired by the articles on Iraq and Cyprus printed side by side in a recent issue of The Economist, I write to ask whether you could send us details of the settlement concluded between the Iraqi Government and the Kurds. From newspaper reports and particularly from the article in The Economist, it would appear that the situation which existed in Iraq and that which continues here were not so dissimilar as we had supposed. We and the US Embassy, who inquired whether we could obtain for them details of the agreement and any relevant commentary thereon, were struck by a number of features in press reports, e.g. the understanding that the Kurds would retain their separate armed forces until such time as the agreement with the Government had been fully implemented.

It seemed possible that features of the agreement concluded in Iraq could at some stage be useful to anyone searching for new ideas to help promote a Cyprus settlement.

Mr Fearn (S.ED)

I hope that the attached paper will be of some use to Nicosia  
P. R. Fearn  
14/4.

Yours ever

(T.L.A. DAUNT)

(T.L.A. DAUNT)

See f. (76)

P.R. Fearn, Esq.,  
Southern European Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.


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13/10  
Regy (NED)  
WE HAVE DONE A PAPER  
ON THE KURDS. LET  
ME HAVE THIS BACK WITH  
A COPY.  
PUMH  
6/4



and a command centre and vehicle concentration, setting the command centre and some vehicles on fire, silencing enemy fire and inflicting casualties. On 2nd April a group, in co-operation with a Popular Liberation Forces group, attacked a position in Mount Hermon, destroying its weapons and inflicting casualties. ("Voice of Palestine" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 3.4.70)



#### Reports in Brief

**Kurdish Democratic Party meeting** (Text) Kirkuk: The Central Committee of the Kurdish Democratic Party will meet today [3.4.70] under the chairmanship of Mustafa Barzani. The Kurdish Ministers in the Iraqi Government have arrived here to take part in this meeting. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.30 GMT 3.4.70)

**Kurdish Democratic Party appointments** (Text) Baghdad: Nuri Shawis, the Public Works and Housing Minister and member of the Political Bureau of the Kurdish Democratic Party, has announced the names of those in the Party's central committee and political bureau. In a press statement published in Baghdad today [4.4.70], Shawis said that the executive committee consisted of 10 members: Abd al-Wahhab al-Atrushi, Rashid Sindi, Nu'man Isa, Muhammad Hirsin, Ali Sajari, Muhammad Amin Muhammad Ali, Fatih Muhammad, Hashim Aqrawi, Yadallah Karim and Isma'il al-Mulla Aziz. The Political Bureau consists of six members, three of whom were nominated by the Party for ministerial posts in the present Cabinet. The six members are Ali Abdullah, Aziz Aqrawi, Muhammad Mahmud, Dr. Mahmud Uthman, Salih al-Yusufi and Nuri Shawis. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.35 GMT 4.4.70)

**Iraqi nationality law amendment** In accordance with a new amendment to the Iraqi nationality law, the Minister of the Interior is empowered to exempt a number of Iraqi nationals who have acquired foreign citizenship from the provision depriving them of their Iraqi nationality. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 11.51 GMT 3.4.70)

**Palestinian students' message to Qadhafi** (Text of cable from General Federation of Palestinian Students) The Palestinian student masses throughout the world have great confidence in the Palestinian revolution and its ability to escalate, continue and frustrate all attempts at trusteeship and containment. Our Palestinian masses, who have forged their path by revolutionary violence and total reliance on the support and protection of the Arab masses, are astonished by what has been said in your speech on the Palestinian revolution. We believe that the reports that have been submitted to you are greatly distorted and false. ("Voice of Palestine" in Arabic 17.30 GMT 3.4.70)

**Kidnap security measures in Lebanon** Beirut: Security measures are being taken following the discovery of a plan to kidnap a number of Arab writers and politicians opposing the policy of a number of Arab rulers. This follows the kidnapping of Zuhayr Shalaq, political writer of the weekly 'Al-Jadid', on 30th March. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 11.22 GMT 3.4.70)

**Statement by Kamal Junblatt** (Text) Beirut: The Minister of the Interior Kamal Junblatt has announced that he will continue to exert efforts to expel well-known circles from power, restore legitimacy and reinforce democracy in Lebanon. In a statement after the session of the Chamber of Deputies yesterday [2.4.70] he said the security forces were unable to apprehend 460 accused because they are in the military area in Bija. Junblatt called for the elimination of such areas. He produced pictures of the Phalangist militia during the Kahhalah incidents and said that those incidents had been premeditated. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 11.46 GMT 3.4.70)

**Treason charge against Ahmad Bin Salih** (Excerpt) The Premier has issued an order on behalf of HE the President of the Republic in accordance with his decision dated 2nd April 1970, to take legal proceedings against the defendant Ahmad Bin Salih, former Secretary of State for National Economy and Planning, on a charge of high treason... (Tunis in French 21.30 GMT and in Arabic 23.00 GMT 3.4.70)



**Other Broadcasts on Israeli-Arab Affairs**

**Israeli air attack on Nile Delta targets** (Text of UAR official statement) A group of enemy aircraft penetrated our air space in the northern coast in the central Delta to attack our guns in this area. Our interceptor fighters confronted the enemy aircraft. A dogfight took place over the northern Delta with about 30 aircraft from both sides taking part. The enemy aircraft escaped from the battle and flew back without achieving their aims. All our aircraft returned safely. We suffered no losses in life or equipment. (Cairo in Arabic 11.45 GMT 3.4.70)

(Abstract of Israeli report) The Israeli Air Force at about 12.00 on 3rd April raided two Egyptian SA-2 ground-to-air missile sites in the Mansurah area in the northern sector of the Delta. All our aircraft returned safely. (Israel in Arabic 22.00 GMT 3.4.70)

**Gaza grenade incident** Two grenades were thrown at an Israeli military transport vehicle in the main street in Gaza at about 09.00 on 3rd April. There were no casualties, but the vehicle was slightly damaged. (Israel in Arabic 11.00 GMT 3.4.70)

**Mortar attack on Geshor** Kibbutz Geshor, in the Jordan valley, came under fire from Jordan on the night of 2nd-3rd April. The mortar bombs caused no casualties or damage and the fire was returned. (Israel in English 11.30 GMT 3.4.70)

**Incident near Janin** Small arms fire was opened at a military transport vehicle south of Janin on the evening of 2nd April. There were no casualties. (Israel in Arabic 11.00 GMT 3.4.70)

**Ramallah grenade incident** A grenade was thrown at an Egged bus in the central square of Ramallah on 3rd April. There were no casualties or damage. (Israel in English 11.30 GMT 3.4.70)

**Firing in the Jordan valley** (Abstract of Jordanian official statement) The enemy opened medium machine-gun fire at our forces in the Zahrat an-Najjar area, southern Jordan valley, at 22.40 on 3rd April. Our forces returned the fire. The exchange continued for 10 minutes. Our forces suffered no losses. (Amman in Arabic 04.01 GMT 4.4.70)

**PLF, PSF and PFLP General Command operations** (Abstract of Palestine Armed Struggle Command communiques) On the night of 31st March-1st April the Popular Liberation Forces attacked the Abu as-Sus observation post, silencing enemy fire and inflicting casualties. On 29th March they detonated a mine under a vehicle in Wadi Fayfa, south of the Dead Sea, and destroyed it. A fighter threw a grenade at a bus in Daiyah Quarter in Gaza, damaging it and killing the driver and co-driver. Another fighter threw a bomb at a military vehicle near a market in Gaza, damaging the vehicle. On 3rd April the PLF killed four soldiers in sniping operations in the Abu as-Sus, Khatib, and Dayr al-Aqra areas, central Jordan valley. The PLF and the Popular Struggle Front attacked ambush and observation posts in Tallat al-Hamra area, destroying a 50mm. machine-gun and silencing another, detonating an anti-personnel minefield, seizing a number of mines and inflicting casualties. On 30th March the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command destroyed a vehicle in the Turkumaniyah area. On the night of 1st-2nd April a clash occurred between our men and ambush parties in the Khisfin area; the enemy suffered casualties and two of our men were killed. ("Voice of Palestine" in Arabic 17.30 GMT 3.4.70)

**Asifah and PLF operations** (Abstract of Palestine Armed Struggle Command communiques) On 2nd April timed charges placed by Asifah Group 77 destroyed two buildings in Deishum settlement, Upper Galilee, inflicting casualties. Asifah attacked a foot patrol at Ghawr al-Balawinah, Turkumaniyah area, inflicting four casualties. Asifah also attacked a foot patrol in Ghawr ash-Shuraynah, Khatib area, inflicting casualties. On the night of 1st-2nd April Asifah Group 123 attacked a camp in Khisfin area, Golan Heights,



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67



Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

7 April, 1970

(NEQ.1/2)

Kurdish Settlement

There has been considerable interest here in the Iraq/Kurdish agreement of 11 March and in particular in its implications for an eventual increase in Iraq's military deployments in Jordan - against Israel and in the South - for confronting Iran and overawing Kuwait. Hence, the enclosed paper which, although in parts is based on sheer speculation, we hope is not too wide of the mark.

2. We should be grateful for any comments in due course. I should stress that the paper is not agreed interdepartmentally or in Whitehall; it is, as it states, N.E.D.'s view.

(S. L. Egerton)

P. McKearney Esq.,  
BAGHDAD

c.c. Chanceries:

Bahrain Residency  
Baghdad  
Ankara  
Tehran  
Kuwait  
Washington  
Moscow  
Paris  
UKMIS Geneva  
UKMIS New York  
Tel Aviv  
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IRAQ: ANNOUNCED SETTLEMENT WITH THE KURDS

On 11 March, 1970 the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council announced the "complete and constitutional settlement of the Kurdish issue". This followed three months of negotiations in Baghdad during which time the Soviet Government seems to have exerted considerable pressure on both sides to settle their differences. The ~~Thirteen~~<sup>Fifteen</sup> Point Agreement, which has been confirmed by Kurdish leaders, is given in full in the Research Department Memorandum at Appendix A, which also compares the new agreement with the abortive settlement of 1966. This is being printed. Both agreements have many points in common.

2. The main points of the published Agreement of 11 March are:-
- (a) The Iraq Government has declared its intention to develop the administrative unity of the Kurdish area and to give the Kurds a measure of autonomy in it.
  - (b) The Kurds are to have an "equitable share" of public office, including a Kurdish Vice President, official posts and senior Army appointments.
  - (c) There are to be Kurdish representatives in the legislature (which is as yet non-existent) in proportion to their percentage of the total population.
  - (d) Kurdish officials are to operate in predominantly Kurdish areas.
  - (e) The Iraq Government will provide relief measures and economic aid in the war-damaged areas of Northern Iraq.



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- 2 -

3. We know from reliable sources that there are some secret clauses to the agreement as follows:-

- (i) A joint committee will be set up to supervise implementation of the whole agreement in consultation with both parties.
- (ii) One of the tasks of the joint committee would be to reduce the number of the Kurdish regular force, if possible, to 6,000 men. During the period of resettlement, which will be in five unspecified stages, the Iraq Government will pay for the general upkeep of the force.
- (iii) The Iraq Government will disarm and disband all Kurdish forces opposed to the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, and the Iraqi armed forces are to be withdrawn to their "normal positions".
- (iv) The Kurdish Democratic Party is to be allowed to operate freely in the Kurdish region and to publish its own newspaper.
- (v) All persons formerly in Iraqi Government service who joined in the Kurdish rebellion will be permitted to resume their employment without loss of seniority. Those who served with the Kurdish regulars (the Pish Merga) are to be permitted to count their service with the Kurds as if they had served in Iraqi Armed Forces.
- (vi) A nation-wide census will take place within one year to define the region of Kurdish majority.
- (vii) Although the Iraqi national flag will not be altered specially to incorporate a Kurdish symbol straightaway, this will be done as and when the national flag is changed.

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- 3 -

4. Since the announcement of the agreement, both the Iraqi Government and the Kurds have been at pains to emphasise their determination to make it stick. On 31 March, as part of a Government reshuffle, five Kurds were appointed to Ministries - including Agriculture, Works and Housing, and the Development of the North. Despite this moderately promising start (Cabinet posts as such are not of much account in present-day Iraq), we believe that the chances of this agreement developing into a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem are slightly less than evens. There are important obscurities in the publicised agreement which are not clarified in the secret annex. These include the precise extent of the Kurdish autonomous area, the exact meaning of the word "autonomy", and the amount to be allocated by the Iraqi Government for the development of the Kurdish region. All these points will cause difficulty from the start and if they are to be seriously gone into will require a further period of tough negotiation. There is no evidence yet that the Iraq Government is ready to undertake this. The Kurds, on the other hand, need a respite from the war but have no reason to trust any Iraq Government, given the past history of relations between them. They will certainly not agree to the final disbanding of the Pish Merga and the surrender of their heavy weapons and wireless station until they have seen the colour of Ba'athi money and substantial progress towards clarification of obscure points in the Agreement.

5. We know that the agreement has caused the Shah concern since he feels that, if successfully implemented, it will free the

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- 4 -

hands of the Ba'ath Government to cause trouble for Kuwait and in the Gulf generally. He may also fear that with their own Kurds more or less under control, the Iraqis may wish to try and subvert those on the Iranian side of the frontier and will be generally freer to try to cause trouble within Iran - for instance in Khuzistan, where there is an Arab population thought to be about three millions. Accordingly the Shah can be counted on to step up his activities within Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to subvert the agreement. This could be the decisive factor if, as seems likely, negotiations on the more delicate issues run into difficulties. The Israelis can be counted on to assist the Persians in this exercise financially and perhaps by increased liaison with Savak etc.

6. If the agreement is eventually successfully implemented there will be scope for the redeployment of some of the Iraqi forces (up to four divisions) at present tied up in the North. There have been indications of the Government's intention to deploy more troops both in Jordan and on the south eastern frontier with Iran but to date, as far as is known, only one battalion has moved from Kurdistan (to Jordan), and it seems improbable that any large scale movements will be made until more progress has been made on implementation. If and when the situation allows such movements, it is probable that a considerable portion of the forces released would go to Jordan to supplement the 15,000 or so Iraqis there at present. The Iraqis have not been notable for any effective show of aggression against Israel, and we would judge that the reinforcement of their contingent in Jordan would be largely for presentational reasons. It is also likely that

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- 5 -

some troops would be posted south to "confront" Iran across the Shatt al Arab. These too would have a largely presentational role, though their presence would to some extent increase tension along the southern part of the Iraq/Iran frontier. It would also increase jitteriness in Kuwait, though we do not consider that the Iraqis have, at present, any aggressive intentions against Kuwait despite heavy Ba'athist hints (not made in public) that they "have Kuwait more or less in their pocket".

7. Unemployed Iraqi hands generally turn to mischief; but the Iraqi's ability to promote mischief outside their own country has fortunately been limited by their inept diplomacy, administrative incompetence and ill-judged timing. Stalemate in Kurdistan suited nearly everybody (except the combatants) very well. It is hard not to see the prospect of peace as a theoretical threat, but the Iraqis can usually be relied on to defeat themselves.

Near Eastern Department

2 April, 1970.

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Reference

NEQ 1/2 (68)

Mr. Egerton

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - APR 1970 NEQ 1/2
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The Ba'athist Government's Settlement with  
the Kurds

FLAG 'A'  
FLAG 'B'

H.M. Ambassador, Baghdad has written an interesting despatch on the agreement of 11 March which is very much on the same lines as our paper of 2 April. He shares our view that there are hard negotiations to come before this settlement can be regarded as a final solution to the Kurdish problems.

2. As our own paper has been launched upwards and as this despatch does not differ from our conclusions in any important respect I do not think that it is necessary to submit departmental comments.

FLAG 'C'

3. I have recommended that the despatch should be printed as a Diplomatic Report and given North Africa and Middle East circulation and also 'Q' Commonwealth distribution. I do not recommend priority printing in this case.

FLAG 'D'

4. An advance copy should be circulated to interested departments within the office and I will arrange this. Mr. Arther, Mr. Hayman and the Permanent Under Secretary will see the Despatch under cover of the usual pro-forma (which should be signed by me and by Mr. Tripp)

...

5. I attach a draft letter of acknowledgement to Mr. Balfour Paul to issue from Mr. Tripp.

*P.R.M. Hinchcliffe*

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
7 April, 1970

P.O. Hinchcliffe  
9/4

The only slight conflict of assessment lies in §15 of the Despatch, which should be read with §7 of our Departmental paper. Mr Balfour Paul (as he should) argues that the settlement is a good thing for us all, if it sticks. NED is more cynical.

§7.4  
Mr. Tripp

2. I have suggested priority printing in the form below, in CONFIDENTIAL view of widespread interest in the agreement. 7/4



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1



(NEQ 1/2)

7 April, 1970.

69

The Ba'athist Government's Settlement with the Kurds

Thank you for your most interesting Despatch of 27 March which we have arranged, under the new system, to be printed for North Africa and Middle East distribution.

2. There has been considerable interest in the Kurdish question here - stimulated by the dramatic announcement of 11 March and this led us to produce our own brief assessment of the agreement - a copy of which has been sent to you under cover of our letter NEQ 1/2 of 7 April. We are delighted (and rather relieved) to find that our conclusions are very much in line with your own!

(J.P. Tripp)

H.E. Mr. H.G. Balfour Paul, CMG,  
BAGHDAD

PS PAM

15/4

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Encl TEMP/F.I.C. 1 MARCH 70

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Mr Egerton

Rem TEL 247  
OF 15/3



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
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3 April 1970

Mr Tripp

Mr Arthur

15/4

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Reg 14/4

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Dear Sir,

### Kurdish Problem

You will have seen the account in our telegram 247 of 31 March of the press conference given by President Bakr on Saturday 28 March to describe progress made so far in implementing the 11 March Manifesto about a settlement of the Kurdish question. I attended and can therefore fill out to a certain extent the brief record given there.

2. The most important points were, as mentioned in the telegram, the future of the Pish Merga, the formation of the National Assembly and the new Ministerial Appointments. Jenner is writing separately about the ministerial appointments.

3. On the Pish Merga you will have seen that the Ambassador in his despatch of 27 March mentioned the obscurity in the original manifesto about their future. The President in his statement and in subsequent answers to questions gave the impression that the original declaration provided for the disbandment and disarmament of all irregular armed forces. It didn't; and though the subject may well have been covered in a "Secret Protocol", it is almost unthinkable that Barzani would accept the total suppression of his private army. The President himself said that the intention was to merge the Pish Merga with the Iraqi Army, which confirms on a more official basis the press reports of similar statements in the past by Saddam Hussein and Mahmoud Othman. Some of it no doubt will be.

4. The President's announcement about progress on the drafting of the National Assembly Bill was perhaps the most important feature of the press conference, and also something of a surprise. The terms of the announcement with the declaration that the National Assembly would assume some of the legislative powers of the Revolutionary Command Council and would comprise, among others, representatives of "the two political parties" go some

/way

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.,  
London S.W.1.

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way to resolving, as far as external appearances are concerned, the points raised by the Ambassador in paragraph 7(a) and (e) of his despatch. But we must wait and see what the Bill says, when it emerges. In any case the Revolutionary Command Council remains firmly a Ba'athi preserve.

5. One physical problem concerned with the re-establishment of a National Assembly will be the rehousing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which at present occupies a large portion of the building. Plans are under way for the construction of a new Ministry building closer to the Presidential Palace and a member of the Ministry with whom I spoke today expects it will be completed in a few months. He would not however be drawn on a possible date for the convocation of a new assembly and the possibility that the Ministry and the Assembly might have to cohabit for a period.

6. There continue to be stories of clashes between Barzanists and Talabanists. These do not seem to be of any great size and are probably in the nature of settling old scores. The Talabanist Governor of Dohuk has been transferred to Hilla and a Kurd, Mohammed Rasul, the Governor of Amara, who is not as far as we know tied to either faction, has taken his place in Dohuk.

7. As you will have doubtless seen from the summary of world broadcasts, the Kurdish radio, the voice of Kurdistan, has closed down. This was of course provided for in the Declaration. The Talabanist newspaper, Al-Nur, ceased publication at the end of March and we understand that the Kurdish newspaper, Al-Ta'akhi, which was banned in 1968, is due to recommence publication on Saturday 4 April. We have already received from a "representative" of the Kurdish Democratic Party a copy of the March edition of their, until now, underground publication Kha'bat (The Struggle).

8. Other developments have included the announcement that tourist areas in the north are to be opened for this year's tourist season and the allocation of funds by the Revolutionary Command Council towards rebuilding of certain tourist resorts. The Five Year Economic Plan for the period 1970-74 which has just been published in talking of the areas in which the private sector can best assist the national economy has called for investment by the private sector in hotels, and restaurants, throughout the country.

9. According to the Finnish chargé one of his compatriots has been recruited through United Nations channels to organize the promised census of Kurdish areas by October.

10. Thus, although the joint Peace Committee which is officially charged with implementing the settlement has only been reported as meeting on one occasion so far, the government for its part has at least made a start; and there has been no rumour to date

/of

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of dissatisfaction or second-thoughts on the part of the Kurds.

*Yours,  
JH*

(J. H. Symons)

copies to: \_\_\_\_\_  
Chancery Tehran,  
Chancery Beirut.

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NKQ 1/2. Spur

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 247

31ST MARCH 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 247 OF 31ST MARCH 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO TEHERAN, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY AND AGENCY), BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND WASHINGTON.

PRESIDENT BAKR GAVE AN UNPRECEDENTED PRESS CONFERENCE ON SATURDAY 28TH MARCH TO DESCRIBE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN IMPLEMENTING THE 11TH MARCH MANIFESTO ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH SETTLEMENT AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS GENERALLY ON IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ATTENDED BY INVITATION.

2. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KURDISH SETTLEMENT THE THREE MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST WERE:
  - A. THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD STARTED TO DISBAND THE IRREGULAR FORCES AND TO RECEIVE THEIR ARMS AND AMMUNITION.
  - B. THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL HAD COMPLETED THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BILL UNDER WHICH THE COUNCIL WOULD GRANT SOME OF ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWERS COMPLEMENTING THOSE EXERCISED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL.THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD COMPRISE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO POLITICAL PARTIES (BA'ATH AND KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY) AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF FEDERATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, POPULAR ORGANISATIONS AND CERTAIN NATIONAL ELEMENTS.
- C. THAT NEW MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED WITHIN THE WEEK.

3. THE QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS CAME IN THE MAIN FROM LEBANESE, JORDANIAN, SYRIAN AND UAR NEWSPAPERS, AND THE MAJOR QUESTION UNDERLYING MANY OF THOSE POSED WAS THE FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE IRAQI ARMY WHICH WOULD BE FREED FROM THEIR DUTIES IN

CONFIDENTIAL

/THE NORTH.



THE NORTH. THE PRESIDENT GAVE NO SPECIFIC ANSWER BUT SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH ISSUE WOULD OFFER THE ARMED FORCES GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCHARGE THEIR DUTIES AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE IRAQI NATION, BOTH ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST.

4. IN A SINGLE REFERENCE TO THE TENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE ARAB BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY THE PRESIDENT REVEALED THAT THE DRAFT SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH ISSUE AS EXPRESSED IN THE 11TH MARCH MANIFESTO HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE CONFERENCE.

5. IN ANSWER TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE ARAB GULF, NONE OF WHICH SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE BAHRAIN/IRAN EXERCISE, THE PRESIDENT SAID 'THE BOLSTERING AND PROTECTION OF THE ARAB CHARACTER OF THE GULF PRINCIPALITIES IS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL TASKS OF THE 17TH JULY REVOLUTION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL TASKS OF ALL GOVERNMENTS AND POPULAR AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES THROUGHOUT THE ARAB HOMELAND'.

6. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PISH MERGA FORCES OF BARZANI AND THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE TALABANIST KURDS. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO MERGE THE PISH MERGA WITH THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND DECLARED 'THE SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN AT NOBODY'S EXPENSE. ALL IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES WERE TO BE LIQUIDATED.

7. SINCE THE CONFERENCE, 12 MINISTERIAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED AMONG THE 8 NEW MINISTERS APPOINTED ARE FIVE KURDS, WHOSE MOST IMPORTANT PORTFOLIOS ARE: AGRICULTURE, WORKS AND HOUSING, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH. A NEW MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT HAS ALSO BEEN FORMED.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HAILED IN THE LOCAL PRESS UNDER THE BANNER HEADLINES 'SENSATIONAL REVELATIONS BY BAKR'. THERE WAS NOTHING SENSATIONAL IN HIS STATEMENT OR IN HIS ANSWERS TO THE PREPARED QUESTIONS. ON THE ARAB GULF FOR INSTANCE THE ANSWER WAS NOTABLE MORE FOR ITS OMISSION THAN FOR ANYTHING HE SAID.



CONFIDENTIAL

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO.247 TO FCO.

-3-

NEVERTHELESS HIS HANDLING OF THE OCCASION WAS SOMETHING OF A PERSONAL SUCCESS, AND HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED CRITICIZING IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS. NOR WAS THERE ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF OURSELVES.

F.CO.O. PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO CCAIRRO TEHERAN, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY AND AGENCY), KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.

MR BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Near Eastern Department

(71)

NEQ 1, -

10 April, 1970

Gordon King, Desk officer at the U.S. Embassy here has asked us to pass on to him, from time to time, any papers of general interest on Iraq - a part of the Middle East, on which, for obvious reasons, he and his colleagues are somewhat unsighted.

2. I thought you should know that I have let him have a copy of Baghdad's interesting despatch on the Kurdish settlement, your copy of which should have reached you by now.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

M. R. Melhuish, Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
Washington

c.c. J. H. Symons, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

*PMU*  
124



**REPUBLIC OF IRAQ**

NEQ 4/2

**BARZANI SAYS KURDS TO ABIDE BY GOVT. 'S DECISIONS**

Kurds

Mulla Mustafa Barzani, leader of the national Kurdish movement in Iraq, has said that the Kurds of Iraq will from now on abide by whatever the central government in Baghdad will decide for them. He made the statement in an interview with Beirut's weekly and pro-Iraq AL SAYYAD published yesterday. The weekly's reporter said the interview was conducted at Nawberdan, in the north of Iraq and about 35 kilometers from the border with Iran. The village, consisting of about 20 mud-houses, is described by the reporter as the headquarters of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the place where the agreement settling the Kurdish problem was reached through negotiations between Barzani and representatives of the central government.

Not Independence. Barzani was asked about the new relationship that has come about as a result of the March 11th Declaration putting an end to the Kurdish insurrection. He said that the relationship between an Iraqi Arab and an Iraqi Kurd was based on the "fact that Arabs and Kurds are one thing. Reason brings them together, and madness puts them apart."

Barzani, when asked whether the March 11th Declaration granting autonomy to the Kurds meant that the Kurdish community became independent, emphasized that "the laws, plans and orders of the Iraqi government apply to Kurdistan" and that the entire Iraqi people backs the Govt. He added that the Kurds are committed to what the people of Iraq decides as well as to the decisions of the Iraqi government.

Future Role. Asked if he had any plans to participate in any official action, now that the Kurdish problem has been settled, Barzani said, according to the interview: "The duty of a person is to serve the people. Therefore, I shall continue to serve the people. I do not consider this as purely politics. I hope I will be able to carry out my duty according to my capabilities."

Barzani said that he has become an old man and passed the retirement age. "My personal desire," he said, "is to stay away from everything. I demand this, and tried several times to realize it. But my brothers (meaning his colleagues) refuse this. Therefore, I shall continue to serve according to my capabilities and in the place they appoint me to."

Talabani. Asked for his views about his rival, Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, who had been supported by the Baathist government in Iraq until the agreement of last month was reached, Barzani emphasized that national Kurdish unity was prevailing. "But there are some traitors and spies, including one who stands against religion, Kurdish nationalism and the rights of minorities. He, therefore, cannot be considered a Kurd nor does he represent any one. He is rejected." Barzani did not mention names.

Commandos and Palestine. Barzani was then asked if the Kurds had any intention of joining the Palestinian resistance movement. He answered: "I personally shall not do so, because this kind of action is not made for an old man like me. I do not have the power nor the capabilities for it." The interviewer said: "I am asking you in your capacity as leader of the Pesh Mergha (Barzani's estimated 20,000-strong irregulars)." Barzani replied: "I am not the leader of the Pesh Mergha. The people's interest is the leader." Asked who should the Palestinian commandos ask about the possibility of making use of the Pesh Mergha, Barzani reportedly gave a straightforward answer: "The President of the Iraqi Republic."

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AB  
H. Hinchcliff

# Kurdish peace -the haggling still goes on

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

16 APR 1970

NEQ 4/2

by LORD KILBRACKEN

**IMPORTANT DETAILS** of the delicate peace talks taking place between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq are slowly becoming known.

Though both sides, in their official statements, have aimed to give the impression that all is peace and light after the years of civil war, it is now clear that serious differences have still to be resolved.

Because these centre largely around the future of Kirkuk, they are of special concern to Western powers—Britain in particular—with major oil interests in Iraq.

The 54 production wells in Kirkuk are operated by the London-based Iraq Petroleum Company, which is 30 per cent British-owned. They show an annual net profit of more than £200 million and are responsible for perhaps four-fifths of the country's production.

It is now known that the Baathist Government in Baghdad has, indeed, agreed to many Kurdish demands to a quite unexpected extent, which may be taken as showing a real desire to end the long and costly war—or, if one is rather more cynical, to secure a lengthy ceasefire.

## Definition

This is now allowing it to redeploy three army divisions—half its total armed forces—from the front in Kurdistan for possible future use against Israel or Iran.

Five Kurds have been appointed Ministers in the central government, headed by the brilliant young Muhamed Mahmoud Abdulrehman, a graduate of the L.S.E., with responsibility for "the reconstruction of the North"—that is, of Kurdistan. An "autonomous region" is to be established with its own local government, law courts, newspapers, schools.

The revolution's army of *pesh mergas* will remain in existence and under arms. All other armed forces will be withdrawn except those in scattered garrisons.

So far, so good. What has not yet been agreed is the degree of self-government to be granted and—perhaps even more important—the area over which it will extend. And this may be the fatal rock on which negotiations seem only too likely to founder.

The central problem is that Kurdistan has never been defined and is, in fact, incapable of precise definition. It is loosely applied to the largely mountainous region about twice the size of Wales where Kurds form the mass of the population.

It stretches across five of

Iraq's 16 *liwas* (provinces), but only three of these—Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk—are wholly and unarguably Kurdish. There are many Kurds in the adjoining *liwas* of Kirkuk (about 60 per cent), Mosul (about 20 per cent) and Dyala (about 20 per cent).

In each case, they are concentrated in the east of the *liwa*, where they form the whole population, but there is then a gentle gradation to considerable areas where they are certainly in a minority.

So, how to draw the line?

A so-called peace committee—five Arabs and four Kurds—has been set up to consider this and other points at issue. The Arabs are headed by Murtadha al-Hadithi, who has much political influence as a member of the Baathist Command Council. Muhamed Mahmoud leads the Kurds.

## Similar

They seem likely to have no less difficulty than the boundary commission in Ireland 50 years ago, which had a strangely similar problem, and perhaps to be no more successful.

In addition to the three all-Kurdish *liwas* named already, it is believed al-Hadithi is offering ONLY two of the five *qadhas* (counties) in the *liwa* of Kirkuk and no part of Mosul or Dyala.

The two Kirkuk *qadhas* offered, Taktak and Chemchemal, which are 99 per cent Kurdish, do NOT embrace the city of Kirkuk nor any known oilfields.

It seems beyond doubt that the Kurds will never settle for so little. Not only will they demand most of the important part of Mosul lying east of the Tigris, a larger share of Kirkuk *liwa* and part of Dyala, but I am informed they consider the city and oilfields of Kirkuk as an absolute condition.

The government, for its part, is just as determined to retain full political control of the whole oil-producing area, even though the Kurds have agreed that Baghdad should remain responsible for the "exploitation of natural resources" throughout the autonomous region. (There is a rather vague understanding that a share of the oil royalties will go to "meet the needs" of the Kurds.)

## A census

A census is to be taken "using United Nations techniques" (but without U.N. supervision) but there is no government undertaking that *qadhas* with a Kurdish majority—however great it may be—will by that very fact be added to the Kurdish autonomous region.

The Kurds claim a 60 per cent majority in the city of Kirkuk, with 20 per cent Arabs, 10 per



cent Turcomans and 10 per cent "others."

It therefore seems certain that though General Barzani, the Kurdish supreme, can claim a notable victory in having already won certain of his most important demands, there must now be a long period of bargaining and disputation with little more than an outside hope of ultimate agreement.

Reg & K.

RRM

16/4.




SECRET

(RR 6/14)

(2 April, 1970)

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

The Kurdish Settlement: comparisons between  
the 1966 and 1970 Proposals



I. Introductory Background

When Dr. Abdel Rahman Bazzaz became Prime Minister of Iraq in 1965 the Kurdish war had been in progress for some five years, and it was one of his main objectives to bring it to a close as soon as possible. He was unable to take the initiative, however, until after the failure of yet another attempt by the Iraqi army to crush the rebels in the spring of 1966, and it was not until early in June that contacts were made with Barzani and that conditions favourable to talks were established. There were then a number of visits by delegations in which views were exchanged, and finally Barzani sent a message to the Prime Minister in which he indicated a wish to come to terms. Dr. Bazzaz responded by broadcasting on 29 June a programme for "restoration of normal conditions in northern Iraq" which he summarised in twelve main headings (the Twelve Points).

2. The impression created by his declaration was that it was a blueprint for an eventual settlement rather than a settlement in itself, that much of its phraseology was ambiguous and that a great deal had been left unsaid. It was felt, nevertheless, that as long as Bazzaz remained in office there was a fair chance of progress, and the Kurds seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the proposals which Barzani welcomed as contributing towards the achievement of peace. By mid-July, however, a reaction had set in, and the Kurds were becoming increasingly disillusioned by lack of any positive signs of implementation, and when Bazzaz was dismissed on 6 August hopes of a settlement virtually disappeared. The Kurds accused the Government of having gone back on the Bazzaz proposals, difficulties appeared in the reinstatement of Kurdish officers, and the Government dragged its feet over Kurdish local government while for its part suspecting that Barzani was not playing straight over surrender of war material, particularly that captured from the Iraqi army. By October there was a stalemate with no further progress likely. Neither side trusted the other and both made frequent allegations of bad faith by the other. Thereafter the position deteriorated steadily with a gradual relapse into further hostilities. Renewed fighting on a considerable scale was reported in January 1967.

3. The war continued inconclusively into 1970, early in which year it was reported that new contacts had been made with the Kurds in an attempt to reach a settlement. It was known that the Government was increasingly concerned about the morale of the large forces tied down in the north, at the ever increasing expense of the war, and the apparent inability of the Army to force a decision. It was believed, however, that these attempts had been unsuccessful, and the announcement of a settlement on 11 March came as something of a surprise. The proposals published by the Government on 12 March follow those of 1966 fairly closely. Once again a blueprint has been produced: it remains to be seen whether present conditions are more favourable to its implementation than those of 1966.

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III. Comment

4. Of the fifteen clauses in the 1970 proposals eleven are repetitions, in slightly different form or with slightly different emphasis, of those of 1966 (see Annex). It is reported, however, that the Kurds are satisfied that they are an improvement on 1966, and Barzani is on record as having said that they had secured all their demands saving only their own flag, a fixed share of the oil revenues and representation on the Revolutionary Command Council. He is said also to be hoping for at least four Ministries in a reconstituted Government. It is possible also that there has been agreement on measures not made public, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Iraqi troops, the retention of the Pesh Mergha as a National Guard in the Kurdish areas and the abandonment by the Government of support for Talabani and his followers.

5. The 1970 proposals do appear to be less vague and rather clearer cut than those of 1966, though there is still much in them which is ambiguous. They contain also four clauses which are not in Bazzaz's Twelve Points. Of these that on the exploitation of national wealth makes it clear that the Kurds are not to enjoy the exclusive benefits of oil exploitation in Kurdish areas; the others, dealing with an economic plan, agrarian reform and appointment of a Kurdish V/President do not add up to any great advance on 1970 from the Kurdish point of view. The gain from the latter appointment is likely to be more prestigious than real, agrarian reform has never been an important issue in northern Iraq, and the economic plan will depend entirely on allocation of funds and executive staff.

6. The most important clause is that (No. 12) in which the Kurds are to be granted autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, which appears to make possible the eventual establishment of autonomous areas under Kurdish local administration, thereby satisfying the Kurdish demand for a separate Kurdish province.

IV. Conclusion

7. It now remains to be seen whether the agreement can be implemented, or whether, as in 1966, inaction, mistrust and different interpretation of imprecise phraseology will lead to gradual failure. Much will depend upon the real inclination of both sides to reach a lasting settlement, on how far the Iranians are prepared to allow this to happen, and on how much confidence the two sides have in each other's good faith. The RCC appear to be more strongly based than Bazzaz in 1966, and so the situation following the latter's fall is perhaps unlikely to be repeated at least exactly in the same way. The Ba'ath, however, and its ruling clique the RCC, are both exclusive organisations unwilling either to share or relinquish power to any extent, and it is therefore a moot question whether the Kurds will succeed in obtaining the full autonomy and degree of equality which the agreement appears to promise them.

Middle East Section,  
Research Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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## II. The Proposals

1970

### The Published Terms

1. Kurdish language recognised officially on a parity with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority.
2. Acceptance of Kurdish participation in the Government and in all Government departments without discrimination. Officials in Kurdish areas to be Kurds or Kurdish speaking.
3. Educational and cultural services for Kurds to be implemented and expanded.
4. Right of the Kurds to have their own "popular organisations".
5. Reinstatement of all former Kurdish military and civil officials, students and workers.
6. Establishment of a Kurdish development commission with an adequate budget.

1966

### Abdel Rahman Bazzaz's Twelve Points

Kurdish to be recognised as an official language side by side with Arabic in areas in which the Kurds are in a majority, and with Arabic as the language of instruction in those areas. (Bazzaz 3.)

All public offices and appointments open to Kurds on a proportional basis including ministerial, judicial, military and diplomatic posts. (Bazzaz 5.)  
Local officials to be Kurds if sufficient available. (Bazzaz 7.)

Kurds to have a fair share of educational grants etc. University of Baghdad to give facilities for study of Kurdish literature, language, etc. (Bazzaz 6.)  
Minister to be appointed for supervision of rehabilitation with control of administrative, linguistic and cultural affairs affecting the Kurds. (Bazzaz 11.)

On return of parliamentary life a measure of freedom of expression and political organisation to be permitted within the law. (Bazzaz 8.)

On termination of hostilities and acts of violence all Kurdish officials and employees to be reinstated in their former posts, including also dismissed workers. (Bazzaz 9.)

A special body, answerable to a Minister, to carry out rehabilitation and development, including tourism, tobacco growing and afforestation. (Bazzaz 11.)



7. Preparation of a special economic plan for the Kurdish region.
8. Rehabilitation of Kurds and Arabs driven out or affected by hostilities. Relief measures for housing and employment to be put in hand.
9. The agrarian reform law to be speeded up in Kurdish areas.
10. Amendment of the interim constitution to confirm the existence of two basic nationalities, Arab and Kurd.
11. Appointment of a Kurd as one of the V/Presidents.
12. Measures to be taken to secure Kurdish national rights and autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic.
13. The exploitation of national wealth in the autonomous area to be the responsibility of the Republican authorities.
14. Kurds to have representation in the legislature in ratio to the population figures.
15. The Kurdish broadcasting station and all heavy weapons to be surrendered.

-

Funds now being spent on the war to be devoted to Kurdish rehabilitation. (Bazzaz 11.)

The Government will endeavour to rehabilitate all individuals and groups in their former places of habitation with a return to the status quo ante as far as possible. (Bazzaz 12.)

-

Kurdish nationality is recognised by the interim constitution, but to be re-emphasised in the forthcoming permanent constitution. Recognises two main nationalities with equal rights and obligations. (Bazzaz 1.)

-

Recognition of Kurdish rights by decentralisation to administrative units with wide powers in local and municipal affairs through elected assemblies. (Bazzaz 2.)

-

Kurds to be represented in the National Assembly on a proportional basis as defined in the new electoral law. (Bazzaz 4.)

All members of the armed forces and police to report to their units. Other armed bodies will be considered as under Government authority and will hand in their weapons in the course of rehabilitation. (Bazzaz 10.)



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ANNEX

Analysis of the 1970 Proposals

1. Language. No change: almost identical with 1966.
2. Participation in the Government. Much the same. The present proposals are slightly more precise.
3. Education and Culture. Much the same: if anything the 1966 version is the more comprehensive and rather less vague.
4. Popular Organisations. No change.
5. Reinstatement of Officials, etc. Much the same.
6. Development Commission. No great difference: the 1970 commission appears to have been given rather greater powers than that proposed in 1966.
7. Economic Plan. Not in the 1966 proposals.
8. Rehabilitation. No change, other than specific mention of Arab as well as Kurdish displacement.
9. Agrarian Reform. Not in the 1966 proposals.
10. Recognition of Kurdish nationality. No change.
11. Appointment of a V/President. Not in the 1966 proposals.
12. Kurdish Autonomy. The 1970 phraseology is more definite and precise than that of 1966. Autonomy is recognised in a fuller and wider sense.
13. Exploitation of national wealth. Not in the 1966 proposals. Has evident reference to oil wealth, and on this the Government has won its point.
14. Representation. No change.
15. Surrender of heavy weapons, etc. Roughly comparable with Point 10 in 1966.

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 12  
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MOSCOW AND THE KURDS

The Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) reacted immediately to the announcement on March 11 that an agreement had been reached between the ruling Iraqi Ba'ath Party and the Kurdish minority in North Iraq, led by Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani. The ICP Central Committee, through First Secretary Aziz Muhammed, sent a telegram to the Ba'ath promising ICP cooperation with it and with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), as well as "all national and progressive forces", to implement the agreement. It added that a settlement with the Kurds would constitute "a pillar of the national front of progressive parties and forces".

The Soviet Union also saw the implications for the proposed "national front", on which discussions have been in progress for more than a year between the Ba'ath and the ICP. Moscow Radio's Arabic Service on March 12 commented that the war had had "an adverse effect on Iraq's moral and political unity, from which internal reactionary elements and hostile foreign powers profited". And Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, in an article by Alexei Vasilyev on March 14, described the agreement as "a wall ... in the path of imperialist intrigue in the Iraqi Republic" which would "help to form all progressive forces into a single national front". Another Pravda commentator, Yuri Primakov, writing before the settlement, had also stressed the importance of peace with the Kurds for Communist participation in a future Iraqi "national front" government. "The outstanding character of the Kurd problem", he said on January 29, "has come to place a serious obstacle in the way of the establishment of a national front, incorporating the Ba'ath Party, the Iraqi Communist Party and other progressive organisations". He went on to express concern at the effect of a prolongation of the conflict on the "progressive" elements among the Kurds themselves; external forces, he said, had been trying to "speculate on the Kurd movement" to change its character and weaken its "democratic substance".

The Soviet interpretation of the Kurdish issue depends partly on the premise that "imperialism" and "internal reaction" have exploited the conflict to hamper the "progressive" movement in Iraq. The Soviet Central Committee newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya (reported by Tass on April 4), even gave it as the motive for the murder of an ICP member, Muhammed al-Khudayri, dismissing the idea that the killing might have been a non-political crime, or in any case unconnected with the Kurdish settlement. The Russian Federation newspaper pointed out that "the crime was committed soon after an agreement was reached on a settlement of the Kurdish problem. ... Reactionary circles in Iraq are trying to obstruct healthy manifestations in the country's domestic affairs; the prospect of a further rapprochement between the ruling Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party arouses in them especial hatred and fear. ... In these circumstances, Muhammed al-Khudayri's assassination assumes a political aspect".

The Soviet Union has long taken an interest in the struggle of the Kurds, seeing in support for their movement an opportunity to increase Soviet influence in Iraq, Syria and Iran, which have substantial Kurdish minorities. The Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, lived in the Soviet Union following the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1947, and there, according to General Hassan Arfa, "the Soviet authorities had the



impression that they had converted Mulla Mustafa to Communist ideas, for the shrewd Kurd considered it wise to appear to be won over to Marxism"\*. Moreover, even if the Soviet Union ultimately understood that Barzanni himself was first and foremost a Kurdish nationalist, with little interest in foreign ideologies, a left-wing in the KDP seemed to offer opportunities for a future growth in Soviet influence on the movement as a whole.

Barzani did not return to Iraq until after the 1958 Revolution. For a time good relations existed between the KDP and the Qasim government, and between the left-wing of the KDP and the ICP; this helped to ensure Communist support for the Kurds when, corresponding to a deterioration in his relations with the Communists, Qasim showed that he was unlikely to fulfil Kurdish demands, and open conflict broke out in North Iraq. Communist support for the Kurdish nationalists was justified by reference to Leninist nationalities policy, though it must be emphasised that Lenin was not concerned with the granting of national rights for their own sake: according to one Kurdish Marxist\*\*, "Lenin has often pointed out that each national problem requires a solution of its own. Although the proletariat recognises 'equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations and assesses every national demand, every national separation, from the angle of the class struggle of the workers'".

Although successive Iraqi governments since 1958 have been in conflict with the Kurdish minority, the Soviet Union has developed extensive economic, military and cultural assistance to these governments. This development of relations with Iraq, combined with a support for the Kurds which has often appeared to the Iraqi government to amount to interference in Iraq's internal affairs, has led to a number of embarrassing diplomatic incidents; but above all, the "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" foreign policies of successive Iraqi governments, combined with an evident willingness to develop relations with the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries, has led to a significant shift in the Soviet attitude on the whole question of Kurdish rights. Even after the Qasim Revolution, Moscow Radio's Arabic Service (September 19, 1958) affirmed that "the Soviet Union, which is loyal to the Lenin nationalities policy, considers that the Kurdish nationality has every right to self-rule in the field of culture, economy and politics", while Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, in his book Kurdistan and the Kurds, as well as the Czechoslovak publisher, clearly foresee a "future Kurdish formation" or "Kurdistan", as an independent national State.

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\*The Kurds, London, 1966; p.102.

\*\* Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, (in English), 1965; p.249. This book is a study of the prospects for an independent, "Socialist" Kurdistan covering all the areas of Kurdish majority in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and the USSR. Like the views of other Kurdish Marxists, it may have led Soviet theorists to over-estimate the strength of the Kurdish Left, and the influence on the KDP of a small group of very articulate intellectuals.



In recent years, however, Soviet propagandists have tended to condemn demands for an independent State of Kurdistan, supporting the slogan of "autonomy within the Iraqi Republic" as a solution. On July 6, 1966, a year after the publication of Ghassemlou's book, an article in Pravda said that the continuation of the war in North Iraq had "been objectively facilitated by extremists within the Kurdish movement who have rejected peaceful approaches and advanced unrealistic demands" - clearly referring to those who continued to support the ICP view in 1956 that self-government "cannot replace the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination, including the formation of an independent State for the whole of Kurdistan" (from an ICP document quoted in the World Marxist Review, August, 1962).

Although the Soviet Union has continued support for the Kurds, despite the "anti-imperialist" policies of the Iraqi government, some Communists have evidently felt that the Kurdish struggle no longer offers significant opportunities for exploitation, and that more is to be gained from full support for a "progressive", Ba'athist government in Baghdad, whatever its attitude to Kurdish rights. In September, 1969, the clandestine Kurdish radio, Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, reacted strongly to a statement by the East German Deputy Foreign Minister, who accused Barzani of having links with the "imperialists". The radio pointed out that East Germany had supported the Kurds until its recognition by Iraq in 1969, saying that East Germany "has paid very dearly to secure its recognition on the part of an isolated government".

A dissident Iraqi Communist, Aziz al-Haj, leader of the "Iraqi Communist Party Central Command" group, has also defected from the traditional Communist line on the Kurds. In an interview on Baghdad Radio on April 3, 1969, he described Barzani as "a despotic tribal leader", and called on Communists serving in the Kurdish movement to "withdraw and dissociate themselves from this movement, which ... has gradually lost its legitimate and nationalist identity".

Aziz al-Haj added that the participation of Communists in the Kurdish movement "has not the slightest influence on the development of the movement", and the Soviet Union has probably also come to the conclusion that it had overestimated the possibilities of influencing the Kurds. It is not therefore surprising that the recent agreement has been greeted with some relief by Soviet propagandists and described (Pravda, March 14) as "a victory for common sense".

April, 1970



a) Cabinet Office,  
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WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT,  
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COMMANDER JIS. HQ B.F.G.

LOCAL INT. COMM Persian Gulf

CinC Near East Air Force.

6) Sir E. Peck,  
Mr. Hayman,  
Mr. Arthur.

I.P.D.

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**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE**

**LONDON, S. W. 1**





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**CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET**

**Southern European Dept.**

(76)

**April, 1970**

**Iraqi Settlement with the Kurds**

With reference to your letter of 1 April, I attach a copy of a paper drafted by Near Eastern Department which sets out the terms of the Iraqi Government's recent agreement with the Kurds. There are certainly points of similarity with the Cyprus situation; but it remains to be seen whether the agreement will endure.

**(P.R. FARN)**

**T.L.A. DAUNT, ESQ.,  
NICOSIA.**

see f (65).

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**CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET**



# The Monitoring Report



PUBLISHED BY THE MONITORING SERVICE OF  
THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION CAVERSHAM PARK READING BERKS

*M. Hinchcliffe page 3.*

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Second Series No. 3369

4 May 1970

*Regg*

*Cut*  
THE USSR

*For*

*KIND FILE*

09.00 GMT 1.5.70 - 15.00 GMT 2.5.70

*4/5*

**US Incursion into Cambodia** The home service, quoting Western agencies, reported that the American and Saigon troops numbered 30,000 and were within 115 km. of Phnom Penh, but no details of the situation within Cambodia were given either by the home service or by Tass, which confined itself to reports of adverse reaction abroad. A short commentary in the home service said that the decision to invade Cambodia had been taken because the Republican Administration had been unable to honour its election promise to find a way out of the "Vietnam impasse", but there was no reason to think that it would benefit the Americans any more than previous stages in the escalation of the war. The only substantial comment in foreign languages monitored over the May Day holiday said that it should now be quite clear what the "Guam doctrine" and "Vietnamisation" meant. \*

**Indonesian Proposal for Asian Conference** A commentary in Indonesian on 30th April accused Indonesia of feigning concern about the situation in Indochina in order to disguise its own involvement in the Pentagon's plans for operations in Cambodia. \*

**Kurdish Visitor's Meeting with Ponomarev** Tass reported on 1st May that the Iraqi Kurd Dara Tawfiq, one of the official visitors to the Lenin Centenary, had had a meeting with Ponomarev on 28th April.

**Yugoslav Defence Minister's Visit** Tass reported on 1st May that a Yugoslav military delegation headed by Col-Gen. Ljubicic, State Secretary for National Defence, was expected to arrive in Moscow on 4th May at Marshal Grechko's invitation and would be attending the celebrations in honour of the 25th anniversary of the victory over fascism.

**May Day** was the dominant topic in both home service and external broadcasts. A report on the evening of May Day gave a list of leading personalities present at the celebration in Red Square consisting of Brezhnev, Voronov, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Pelse, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, Suslov, Shelepin, Andropov, Grishin, Demichev, Kapitonov, Katushev, Kulakov, Ponomarev and Solomentsev. It also said that Major Raul Castro Ruz, Cuban Deputy Premier and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, was present.

\* For details see Appendices

*X Pb*  
*5/5*



**II - EASTERN EUROPE**

09.00 GMT 1.5.70 - 14.00 GMT 2.5.70

**Czechoslovakia** Prague radio (05.00 GMT 2.5.70) reported the announcement in the 2nd May issue of 'Rude Pravo' that an official Soviet Party and Government delegation would visit Czechoslovakia "next week" at the invitation of the CPCz Central Committee, the President and the Government. The delegation, which will be led by Brezhnev, will be composed of Kosygin, Shelest (First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party), Masherov (First Secretary of the Belorussian Party), Katushev (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), Gromyko, and Chervonenko (Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia). \*\*

Prague radio, in its Czech service for abroad (08.00 GMT 2.5.70), reported the setting up of two new Institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, one for Philosophy and Sociology, the other for Czechoslovak and World History. The latter, created by the reconstruction of the Historical Institute, will be concerned with important problems of national history, the history of the Czech State, the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and will publish, among other journals, 'Cesky Casopis Historicky' and 'Historie'. "As a scientific and ideological centre, the Institute will apply Marxist methods in its studies and develop its activities in harmony with the interests of the socialist camp." \*\*\*

**Official Visits** BTA (2.5.70) reported the departure of Ivan Bashev, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, for Cairo (see EE/3362/i); he will "pass through Turkey". Belgrade radio (2.5.70) announced that Edvard Kardelj, member of the Council of the Federation, had left by air for a tour of some Latin American countries, in the course of which he would visit Chile, Peru and Mexico and have talks with "the most distinguished personages of political and social life in these countries". Tanyug reported (2.5.70) that Premier Ribicic announced in a Yugoslav television interview that he would visit the USSR "before the end of this year". His visit might be an occasion for "a more all-embracing consideration of co-operation and relations between the two countries".

**\*\* Details to be published later**

\* For details see Appendices



78  
m. Hinchcliff

THE war between the Kurds and Arabs in Iraq was a rough and nasty little war. It may have been small and desultory by world standards. But in nine years it has killed and maimed a lot of people—casualties among Iraqi regular forces in the past five months of it are estimated at 1,000—smashed up the developed areas of Kurdistan and denied development to the rest, and disrupted the economy of the whole country. Further, failure to end the war either through military victory or through a settlement has been an important factor in the instability of successive Iraqi governments since 1961.

Now the much-maligned Ba'ath regime, principally known in the West for its executions of political prisoners and its venomous attitude toward Israel, has achieved a settlement. Three earlier "final settlements" have collapsed, and the first news of this March 11 agreement was greeted with scepticism by many outside Iraq.

### Border guard

But in fact the Kurds have got most of what they wanted and were fighting for. They will have a Kurdistan autonomous region within four years, its boundaries to be defined after a census to be held within one year. Five Kurdish Ministers have been appointed and a Kurdish Vice-President is to be appointed soon. They have been promised everything possible in the way of cash and resources for the rehabilitation and development of Kurdistan.

Finally, Kurdistan will in effect retain its armed forces

# Kurds trying to catch up after war

BY MARTIN WOOLLACOTT

—the famous Peshmarga—in the form of border guard and police units, and will keep its heavy weapons for the time being, an arrangement described to me by a Minister as "the last guarantee."

The real guarantee that this is the final settlement lies elsewhere. On the one hand there is the desperate desire of the Kurdish leadership for the economic development of their country. The Kurds appear convinced they are living in a mineral treasure house, and they also see great possibilities in tourism, wine, and the expansion of the tobacco industry. They want roads, schools, houses, hospitals and they know they can only get them in a partnership with Bagdad.

On the Arab side, there is the same hope that the end of the war will bring economic growth to Iraq as a whole.

One of the most heartening things about the settlement is the arrival in Bagdad of men like Mohammed Mahmoud, the new Kurdish Minister for Northern Affairs. Mahmoud is resolutely disposed

to trust his Arab colleagues. He is equally determined to push for realistic economic policies and for the democratisation of the regime.

On his desk as I talked to him were two volumes of an Italian report on Kurdistan's economic needs, made in 1967. Whether he will get the 40 million Iraqi dinars the report recommended for initial development, Mahmoud does not know. "What I am sure of is that the Government, especially the President, wants to give us everything available to develop Kurdistan and heal its injured face."

### Friction


Nevertheless there is obviously going to be friction as the Kurds, bringing with them ideas and principles which sit ill with current Ba'ath preoccupations, join in arguments over policy and manoeuvring for position within the Iraqi leadership. The KDP is clearly in no sense as obsessed with the problem of Israel as the Ba'ath Party. It is much more concerned that economic policy should be effi-

cient rather than that it should be ideologically sound. And finally, for a variety of reasons, the Kurds believe in majority government and democratic rights.

They have apparently extracted certain promises from Bagdad on the formation of a "national front." General Mustafa al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader, told the official Iraqi news agency shortly after the settlement: "The welfare of the country ... requires the participation of all political forces in one national front." That means the Communists, whose partly Arab units fought alongside the Peshmarga during the war, and other left-wing groups, but also, according to Mahmoud, centre, and right-wing parties.

"We believe," says Mahmoud, "that it is necessary to have a majority government—it is vital ... the very least of it is to have more democratic liberties, freedom of speech and the press ... other parties allowed to form and organise." The KDP, he said, stood for four things: Kurdistan autonomy, democratic rights, economic growth and "a more realistic attitude to other Arab nations," this latter perhaps in part a euphemism for a more moderate line on Israel.

Of these four KDP principles Bagdad has, of course, accepted the first; there can be no quarrel over the second, although there will be differences over methods; on the two latter the question mark remains. But it is good to know that there is now someone in Bagdad pushing for democratic rights and a realistic foreign policy, and some chance, in the flush of a new beginning, that they will get their way.



Reg. 10

Kurdish File

PRMH

4/5



Background

(a) Internal

The present Ba'ath régime, in power since July 1968, remains despite a continual internal power struggle, its isolation from other political elements (the Nasserites, Communists), and although distrusted by the Shia majority in the country, firmly entrenched in power.

2. During the past year there have been various agreements with Soviet bloc countries, notably in the sphere of technical assistance for Iraq's oil industry. Russian arms supplies have continued to Iraq, and there are some 300 bloc personnel serving with the Iraqi forces (primarily in a technical capacity). Soviet influence in Iraq is considerable, mainly because of the USSR's public stand on the Palestine question. Iraq is however far from being a Soviet puppet.

(b) Kurdish settlement

3. Following the much heralded Agreement of 11 March, both the Iraq Government and the Kurds have been at pains in emphasising their intention of making the settlement stick. However, we believe that the chances of its developing into a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem are slightly less than evens.

4. We know from reliable sources that the Shah is worried about the settlement, as he fears that if it is successfully implemented it will allow the Iraqis to cause trouble for Kuwait, in the Gulf generally, and (though he does not admit it) probably in Khuzistan also.



There are a considerable number of Kurds both in Iran and in Turkey (in the latter case referred to as "Mountain Turks"). They have been generally passive in their relationships with their governments. However, if the Iraqi Kurds are seen to be enjoying some measure of autonomy, this could in time make Kurds elsewhere restive: and, in the case of Iran, possibly receptive to Iraqi subversion.

5. We know that there has been considerable Soviet pressure on both the Kurds and the Iraq Government to settle their differences. It may be that the Russians intend to exploit increasing Iraqi ambitions in the Persian Gulf for their own long term aims. Even if this turns out to be a significant factor towards making the Agreement stick, it should be more than counterbalanced by the suspicions of ~~the~~ Iraqi Kurds; the desire of the Shah to restore the status quo; and perhaps, above all, by the incompetence of the Central Iraqi Government. However, if despite all this, the Agreement is eventually successfully implemented, there will be scope for the redeployment of some of the Iraqi forces (up to four divisions at present tied up in the North) to Jordan or to the South to "confront" Iran across the Shatt al Arab. These troops would have a largely presentational role, though their presence in the South could increase tension along the Southern part of the Iraq/Iran frontier.



**SECRET**

6. Such a deployment would also raise fears of Iraqi intentions towards Kuwait. However, we do not consider that the Iraqis have, at present, any aggressive intentions despite heavy hints (not made in public) that they have Kuwait "in their pocket".

**SECRET**



CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF NO.5 (i)c

CENTO Ministerial Meeting  
Washington 14-15 May, 1970

IRAQ (IN THE LIGHT OF A SETTLE-  
MENT WITH THE KURDS)

Speaking Notes

Ba'ath régime seems firmly entrenched; its prestige enhanced by settlement with the Kurds. But as yet uncertain if agreement will stick; important obscurities in terms of settlement; further negotiations between parties will be required.

2. Premature therefore at this stage to exaggerate immediate impact on Iraqi policy towards Iran, the Gulf of Israel; release of a significant number of troops still tied up in Kurdistan unlikely in the near future.

3. Iraq continues to develop close ties with Soviet bloc; continuation of Soviet arms supplies, aid and technical assistance (mostly for petroleum development).

4. Iraq/Syrian relations still uneasy; improvement unlikely; efforts being made to mend fences with UAR and Lebanon; desire to form closer ties with the two Yemens; ambitions towards the Gulf; possible danger to Jordan.


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Kurdish in Iraq  
PMM  
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Reference

Mr. P. R. M. Hinchcliffe  
(Near Eastern Department)



Speech of the Kurdistan Party Representative

At The Lenin Celebrations In Moscow

Pravda of 28 April carried the text of the speech made in Moscow at the Lenin celebrations by Habib A. Kerim, described as Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan.

2. His presence in itself is interesting, given the attendance also of the First Secretary of the ~~Communist~~ Communist Party (whose speech appeared in Pravda of 26 April). Kerim, having paid the necessary tributes to Lenin, noted "with pride" that Kurds living in the USSR enjoyed "all their national rights". But more significant was his acknowledgment of the part played by the USSR in ~~obtaining~~ the recent "settlement" of the Kurdish question. While this tells us nothing that we did not suspect already about Soviet participation (see Baghdad despatch NEQ 1/2 of 2 April), the Soviet reader would be hearing of it for the first time. The passage is just worth quoting in full for the record:

"Our Iraqi people - both Arabs and Kurds - value highly the noble efforts of the friendly Soviet Union in putting an end to the fratricidal war between the sons of this country, and in re-establishing calm and peace in Iraq. In the terms of the statement published on 11 March this year, the Kurdish people have been granted ~~the~~ legitimate right to autonomy in the framework of the Iraqi Republic. We hope that the Soviet Union in agreement with the national authorities of Iraq will make its contribution to the reestablishment of the Kurdish regions which were destroyed in the sad years of the fratricidal war. "

3. It is noteworthy that Kerim made no reference to the Iraqi Communist Party and that the representative of that Party in his speech did not refer to the Kurdish people or to Kurdistan.

K.A. Bishop.

(K. A. Bishop)  
30 April, 1970

Research Department  
Soviet Section

Copied to

Mr. Mallaby  
E.E.S.D.

Mrs. A.C. Elwell  
IRD.

Miss M. Sandy (Research Dept)  
River Walk House.

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Mr. T. J. D.  
Mr. E. J. D.  
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Ammash said he was pleased with the progress achieved by Algeria in its oil policy, including the national marketing of oil and Government control over several oil companies. He added that in Algiers he had met Qa'id Ahmad, official in charge of the Algerian National Liberation Front, who had conveyed greetings to the members of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and had invited a Ba'th Party delegation to visit Algeria.

The Vice-President said a delegation of the Arab Socialist Union of the UAR would arrive in Baghdad soon for Party talks with a delegation of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party in order to eliminate all dregs of the past and to co-ordinate the efforts of the two national organisations in the two fraternal countries.

Vice-President Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar at-Tikriti, several members of the Revolution Command Council and several Ministers met Vice-President Ammash on his return.

### The Kurdish Settlement in Iraq

NE 1/2

Baghdad home service in Arabic 15.00 and 19.00 GMT 8.5.70

15.00 GMT: Text of report:

The Justice Minister, Aziz Sharif; the Public Works and Housing Minister, Nuri Shawish; and the Public Works and Housing Ministry Under-Secretary, Muhib ad-Din at-Ta'i, visiting the Galalah Sub-District, Arbil Province, today on an inspection tour of the Northern area along with the Minister of State, Salih al-Yusufi, were guests at a luncheon given by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, President of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Following the luncheon, the Ministers discussed with Barzani matters related to implementation of the 11th March proclamation. Barzani told the Iraqi News Agency that several important points included in the 11th March proclamation had already been implemented and added that the proclamation was a fulfilment of the aspirations of the Kurdish people and that other parts of it would be implemented soon.

On the participation of the Peshmarga forces in the Arab battle of liberation against the Zionist invaders, Barzani said the Peshmargas were an inseparable part of the Iraqi Armed Forces. The Peshmarga were implementing the plans of the Iraqi Government and their stand on the fateful Arab issues was inseparable from the stand of the Iraqi authorities, Barzani added.

19.00 GMT: Excerpts from commentary:

When the progressive 17th Revolution formulated the 11th March statement declaring a democratic solution of the Kurdish issue through recognition of all Kurdish national rights and ambitions including self-rule, the revolution was not ignorant of the fact that the proclamation would arouse the hostility of the reactionaries, imperialists, those who understood Arab nationalism in a chauvinist manner contradictory to the spirit of the age, and the pseudo-nationalists who for a number of years had concealed themselves behind Arab nationalism. During these years, the chauvinists and pseudo-nationalists tried to eliminate the human context of Arab nationalism and its progressive and constructive substance represented in the live interaction between Arab nationalism and the various currents of contemporary scientific socialist thought...

These fanatical forces have recognised that revolutionary Iraq's victory in settling the Kurdish question peacefully, justly and democratically poses a danger to them - the danger that the revolution has gone beyond their ideas and has placed them where they belong - in the camp of the reactionary forces. Thus, these forces are shedding crocodiles tears about Arab nationalism in Iraq on the pretext that to grant the Kurds their national rights means the loss of Arabism and repression of the Arab masses in



The Iraqi Region, as if Arab nationalism cannot exist or flourish unless it fights the Kurds, or as if Arab nationalism becomes stronger when it persecutes other nationalities and strangles their legitimate human rights.

Revolutionary Iraq's victory in settling the Kurdish question peacefully and democratically is the greatest victory of the Arab revolutionary forces on the level of promotion of ideas in the seventies...

The Iraqi revolutionary Government feels that the raising of such voices does grave harm to the ideal of Arab nationalism and reflects negatively on the unity of the people's struggle - the unity which is built on domestic nationalities as its genuine popular base.

As for revolutionary Iraq, it will go forward without hesitation to implement the 11th March statement, because every step achieved in this direction is a slap by the revolution at the malicious reactionary factions, is the best expression of the revolution's power, and is the best demonstration of the Iraqi people's national unity - a unity represented in the cohesion of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party as two vanguard forces constituting the strongest pillars of the popular movement in the Iraqi Region...

#### Baghdad 'Ath-Thawrah's' Reply to Beirut 'Ar-Rayah'

Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.00 GMT 8.5.70

#### Excerpts from report:

The Iraqi newspaper 'Ath-Thawrah' today answers the Beirut newspaper 'Ar-Rayah's' attempt to discredit the Iraqi revolution. The paper says: The latest ludicrous report, published under red headlines in 'Ar-Rayah', says that the Iraqi security forces have raided a number of fida'i houses, arrested a number of fida'iyyin and confiscated certain documents belonging to the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP).

Before answering this paper, which hoists the banner of lies against Iraq and its people, we must recall two events which took place the same day the paper published its lie.

(1) 'Ettela'at', the Iranian newspaper which represents US Central Intelligence, reported that the Iraqi security forces had attacked and detained a number of anti-Ba'thist regime citizens and severely tortured them. It is fitting for 'Ar-Rayah' to be proud to join 'Ettela'at' against the Iraqi revolution and to agree with the spirit of reports published in 'Ettela'at' - organ of the Shah's Administration, which is financed by US imperialism.

(2) The funeral of a Southern Yemeni fida'i took place in Baghdad, in which the majority of the fida'i organisations and official and popular circles took part. It is unfortunate for the lying 'Ar-Rayah' that a mass funeral was accorded to a hero Yemeni fida'i in revolutionary Baghdad at a time when 'Ar-Rayah' was accusing Iraq of anti-fida'i action.

We should, however, state what actually happened. The Iraqi authorities had summoned four DPFLP representatives in Iraq to draw their attention to a forgery harmful to fida'i action on one hand and the Iraqi revolution on the other. The matter ended at this point. There were no arrests, no offices closed, and none of the falsifications reported in 'Ar-Rayah'.

On this occasion we tell 'Ar-Rayah' and its masters, financiers and trustees that the Iraqi revolution is the revolution of sacrifice. It is an extension and another form of this revolution because the fida'i action has been an answer to the decrepit methods of classical Arab action...




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


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**Dear Department-**


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I attach a Novosti translation of an article which appeared in Pravda on 5 April, which you may find of interest, since it examines the solution of the Kurdish problem in rather greater depth than any so far.



*Yours ever-  
Nick Livingston.*

(N. H. Livingston)

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W. 1.



c.c. Chancery, Baghdad.



IRAQ: DIFFICULT FRONTIER OVERCOME

I. Belyaev and E. Primakov

There were thousands of joyous Kurd bonfires burning on the mountains around Kirkuk, and the festively decorated rostrum on Al-Tahrir square in Baghdad looked like an island during the nation wide demonstration after the announcement of the termination of war against the Kurds, in the northern part of Iraq. Standing next to A. Bakr, the president of Iraq, and Saddam Hussein Tikriti, chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command, and wearing national dress were the sons of Mullah Mustafa Barzani--Idris and Masud, Mahmud Saman (alias Dr. Mahmud) head of the Kurd delegation at the talks with the Iraqi government, and others.

Idris, Masud, Dr. Mahmud, Sami, member of the Politbureau of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, just as most of the other representatives of the Kurds, had not been in Baghdad since 1961. Nine years there was a fratricidal war in the country.

We were told how glad the men and many officers of the Iraqi Army were to hear about the success of the negotiations with the Kurds. One of the authors of this article saw a small group of military men who were helping local inhabitants to clear a road running from the Diana-Rawanduz fork, to the north, via the Iraqi Kurdistan. In the years of the war there was not a single Iraqi soldier or a government official north of the fork. The area was completely under the control of the detachments of the Peshmerga Kurd rebels.

The end of the nine-year war in North of Iraq--with napalm, with villages burned down, and a toll of thousands of human lives--is really a big reason for joy. Yet, this is not the only importance of the understanding reached between the Iraqi Government and the Kurd movement, about a peaceful and democratic solution of a problem very complicated for Iraq. And this was announced on the night of March 11, 1970, in a declaration read out by President A. Bakr over the Baghdad Radio and television. The main feature in the declaration is the declaration of peace on the basis of recognition of the right of the Kurds to have national autonomy within the state of Iraq. Along with the Arabs, the Kurds have been proclaimed a basic nationality in Iraq.



- 2 -

And now a Kurd will hold the office of Vice President of the Republic. Five Kurd ministers are already in the Government.

The proclamation of the national autonomy of the Kurds is an objective necessity without which there could be no durable alliance between the two peoples; this is the only method of solving the national problem in Iraq. This is a new page not only in the history of the country, for this is the first event of this kind in the millennium-old history of the Kurds.

They are a proud and industrious people inhabiting parts of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. And the Kurd population in Iraq is particularly famous for their revolutionary traditions. The Barzan tribe, one of the main among the Kurds, since the beginning of the 20th century waged a struggle (including armed action) against the British colonial authorities, the corrupt royal court, and the pro-imperialist governments in Baghdad.

After the July revolution of 1958 in Iraq, the revolution which toppled Nuri Said's regime that could stay in power only with the support of British bayonets, there appeared hopes for a just and democratic solution of the Kurd problem in the country. Yet, General Kassem started another war against the Kurds.

Many governments have come and gone in Iraq in the post-revolutionary period after 1958. However, not a single one of them could radically tackle the Kurd problem. Not a single one of them could go further than making tiny steps towards a cease-fire. They all, in various degrees, were engaged in a fierce war against the Kurds which sometimes assumed the nature of genocide.

The situation changed after July 1968, when the regime led by the Ba'athists, who had undergone substantial evolution, was established in Iraq.<sup>+</sup> However, for the country's current leaders it was also not easy to reach the frontier of March 11, 1970. This inertia of the past was an impediment. The gap of distrust, which had appeared as a result of many years of bloody war, was separating the two peoples. And the job of bridging this gap had to be done by overcoming a very difficult period of barriers and obstacles engineered by the counter-revolutionary elements and extremists operating in Baghdad and in the Kurd camp. Yet, the new Iraqi leaders realised that the solution of the Kurd problem would in many ways determine the attitude of the masses to the regime, to the future of the Iraqi revolution, to the country's unity

---

<sup>+</sup>) Baath is an abbreviation for the party of Arab Socialist Revival. The present leaders of the Party in Iraq have implemented some measures in the interests of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle and in the interests of the masses in their country.



Monday, April 6, 1970

3

- 3 -

confronted by the imperialist, Zionist aggression in the Middle East.

President Bakr, speaking over the radio and television, on March 11, said that the solution of the national problem in Iraq was an organic component in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. The same idea was emphasised, in a message to the President of Iraq, by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurds.

The success reached in solving the Kurdish problem in Iraq was largely conditioned by the persistent struggle conducted by the Iraqi Communists for an early peaceful and democratic settlement in the North. The principle of national autonomy for the Kurds, complete recognition of their national rights within the framework of the Iraqi state, and the protection of their national interests--all these slogans and demands were advanced by the Iraqi Communist Party, as a basis for the solution of the Kurd problem, and recorded in some of the documents of the ICP. Speaking of the importance of the understanding between the government of Iraq and the Kurds, Aziz Muhammed, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, told us:

"The decisions which have led to a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurd problem is a victory for all progressive forces in Iraq. This is also a major success for the international democratic and progressive movement."

It is hard to overestimate the part which was played in the settlement in the north of Iraq, by Aziz Sherif, winner of the International Lenin Prize for the promotion of peace and also prominent Iraqi public figure. As he carried out the noble mission of trying to bring views together, he promoted the success of the talks as he used his rich experience of life, great energy, his internationalist and patriotic convictions.

The solution of the Kurd problem is very important especially for Iraq itself--this is indisputable. Without a settlement with the Kurds the country's leftist development was impeded; there were serious obstacles to the development of progressive tendencies in the policies of the current Iraqi leadership. Last but not least, in the past few years there appeared some dangerous symptoms in the Kurd movement itself. The imperialist forces insistently tried to penetrate it and arouse anti-Arab sentiments, and use this movement for the alien purposes of subversive activity against any leadership in Iraq, including the patriotic one, and on a broader scale--to weaken the positions of all the Arab countries in the hard struggle to eliminate the dangerous consequences of Israeli aggression. And now the obstacles on the road to



Monday, April 6, 1970

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- 4 -

Iraq's revolutionary development can be eliminated.

Naturally, their elimination does not mean that all difficulties will disappear. Yet, the progressive course will no doubt be continued, we were told by Saddam Hussein Tikriti, a prominent leader of the Baath ruling party. And in this respect the solution of the Kurd problem is an indispensable and vitally important beginning of a process which must go on.

The most important problem at a national level is now definitely that of establishing a single democratic front of all the progressive parties in Iraq, we were told in a talk with Murtada al-Hadisi, Abdel Khalek Samarraï and some other leaders of the Baath party.

One can venture to say that the need for this is realised by upright and consistent patriots--anti-imperialists and all the Left-wing personalities in modern Iraq. Their desire to establish a national front in the country has been mentioned, in talks with us, by Baath leaders and the leaders of the Iraqi Communist Party. Yet, one cannot but notice that the country still has forces within it which are pursuing diametrically opposite goals. In the past they were unable to prevent the solution of the Kurd problem. And now they are doing everything they can to thwart the development of events which are most undesirable for them. Thus, there are some people who are already beginning to talk--true, in undertones--that it is necessary to have only an alliance of separate parties and to arbitrarily preclude from the planned single national democratic front the Iraqi Communist Party. And this party, as everyone knows, is an authoritative and influential political force in the country. It is quite obvious that the question of isolating the ICP is obviously unrealistic. It does not reflect the correlation of forces which has developed in Iraq in the past few years, and does not promote in any measure the establishment of inner and outer conditions favourable for progressive development in the country.

The solution of the Kurd problem in Iraq is of significance for all Arabs. We were told that the ambassador of the Republic of the Sudan in Baghdad was the first to congratulate the Iraqi leadership on the achieved success. It is well known what great importance for Khartoum is held by a solution of the problem of the South inhabited by negroid Nilotic tribes. Approaching from peaceful democratic positions the solution of the Kurd problem in Iraq, the present Iraqi government undoubtedly sets an example of a correct and bold solution of questions pertaining to national minorities to other countries of the Middle East and Africa, to the entire Third World.



- 5 -

The actions which brought about the cessation of the fratricidal war in Iraq must not be examined in isolation from the struggle for eradicating the consequences of Israeli aggression. Tel Aviv and some Western capitals are obviously disturbed by the fact that the internal possibilities of Iraq for stepping up the struggle against imperialism are now increasing.

Of course, the important positive results already achieved in a settlement with the Kurds in Iraq are not a solution of the entire problem. The experience of many countries shows that a successful national policy is a difficult matter requiring painstaking constant work, which in Iraq is practically only beginning. We also must not ignore the incessant, and in some cases even greater activity of foreign agents and local reactionary elements who are doing everything to complicate once again relations with the Kurds and to frustrate the implementation of the principles proclaimed on March 11. It has been learned from usually reliable sources that separate terroristic groups are being sent to North Iraq from the outside with the assignment to carry out acts of sabotage, to prevent the strengthening of mutual confidence, to sow new seeds of suspicion between the government and the Kurds. It is perfectly natural that in such a situation, as stressed by Saddam Tikriti, extensive work on both sides to create new relations between Arabs and Kurds, relations based on mutual trust and precluding the possibility of success by any anti-Iraqi provocation, remains Problem No.1.

"I hold that it is necessary to implement the declaration as swiftly as possible," Dr. Mahmud, member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, stated in an interview given to Pravda correspondents. "The enemies both within and outside the country are trying to hatch plots and intrigues, hoping to undermine the carrying out of the agreement. Our Democratic Party of Kurdistan is fully resolved to overcome difficulties and seriously and thoroughly live up to the clauses of the declaration. The Baath Party is also imbued with the same determination. The entire people of Iraq support this agreement and call for its fulfillment."

Dr. Mahmud spoke highly of the favourable influence exerted by the Soviet policy in the Middle East in the search for an agreement. He said that the friendly Soviet Union supported the peaceful solution of the Kurd question, the USSR helped to clear the atmosphere with the object of encouraging the dialogue and facilitating the necessary results in order to ensure the Arab and the Kurd national interests.

And so, the first difficult landmark has been crossed by Iraq.

(Pravda, April 5. In full.)





**JEDDA.**

2. M' ~~EE~~

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23 May, 1970.

2. ~~ENTER~~

Den Stephen.

Saudi Arabia/Iraq

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When Ian Winchester and I called on Ziad Shawwaf, the Head of Western Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 May, I asked about the hostile propaganda against Saudi Arabia which has been going out of Baghdad in recent weeks. Ziad said that the Saudis could not understand the Iraqi attacks, /they were for domestic consumption. /presumably

2. Mahmud Baban, who had tea with Berkeley Milne and myself in the afternoon, said that the talks were undoubtedly a sign of internal weakness and a feeling of isolation from the main stream of events in the Gulf. When he had called at the Iraqi Embassy that morning he had been warmly welcomed by the new Counsellor, Muhieddin al Khatib, the son of a Shi'a religious leader in Adhamiya who has just replaced his Ba'athi predecessor, Malik al Ani. He had been invited to call on the Ambassador, Salim Nu'aimi, who had been equally friendly. He told Mahmud that he was welcome any time, the Embassy had now got rid of its "bad elements". According to Mahmud, Salih had then told him that when he delivered a message to the King from Ahmad Hassan al Bakr last week, he had told the King that he was very upset by his Government's attitude and wanted to resign. The King had reassured him by saying that he would prefer him to stay rather than be replaced by someone he did not know. Salih read extracts from al Bakr's letter to Mahmud. The general theme was a request for Saudi Arabia to co-operate with Iraq against imperialism etc., etc. with the Gulf. The King's reply to the Ambassador was that he would welcome Iraq's co-operation if he was assured of the Iraqi Government's sincerity.

3. I asked Mahmud about his news from Iraq. He said he had just received a long letter from Baba Ali and a message from Mulla Mustafa. The situation was not good. The Government had so far only implemented some minor points of the Kurdish Agreement. The Mulla was holding the pish merga together and had refused leave to his officers. He had asked Mahmud to visit him by Tehran but Mahmud did not think he would go but he was not sure that the Iranians would be so willing to co-operate (I also think that he is afraid of putting his foot wrong with the Saudis who now employ him as a legal adviser to the Security Authorities.

S.L. Egerton Esq.,

Arabian Department.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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Yours truly,

(H. St. J. B. Armitage)







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between army-controlled Iraq and Pish Merga-controlled Kurdistan. Some army units have been permitted beyond this barrier to assist in the construction of the township near Galala and the reconstruction of the tourist facilities at Haji Omran but they are primarily construction men with only a few infantry to assist them.

5. The most disturbing aspect of the present situation vis-a-vis the Kurds would seem to be the constant rumours circulating in Baghdad that serious difficulties have been encountered between the two sides over the interpretation of the agreement and over the allocation by the Government of sufficient funds to develop the North in a manner satisfying to Barzani. We have heard stories of violent reaction by Barzani to Government endeavours in the North by means of "popular work" rather than by proper construction contracts. If this is the principle that they are applying there, then to judge by the appalling standard of popular work projects in the rest of the country, Barzani has a valid grudge. My own impression of the road building however was that this was being done in a fairly professional way, sufficient at any rate to stand up to the fairly harsh climate of the region. As regards the true provision of funds the Ambassador was recently told in confidence by a D.G. in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform that a cut of 35% had been imposed in the allocations to his and other ministries for reallocation to the North.

6. The Pish Merga have now been proclaimed a national border guard. Saadun Ghaidan, the Minister of the Interior, visited the North together with one of the Kurdish Ministers to make the necessary arrangements for the transformation of the Pish Merga into this rather nebulous force. My observations on the ground can merely confirm that the Pish Merga continue to exercise complete authority throughout their previous region and that individual Kurds outside that area are now proclaiming themselves members of the Pish Merga as the "in-thing" to do. They are certainly not confined to the Iraqi/Iranian border itself. They retain their independent status, while drawing their pay we understand from the Defence budget. Few have shown any desire to join the army except a very small number of ex-army officer deserters.

7. Despite the rumours of difficulties between the two sides there still seems to be a genuine desire on the part of both sides to maintain the agreement and in their own different ways to implement it. The rumours of Barzani's anger at "popular work" seem to have led to a precipitate visit to the North by Saddam Hussein despite what must be a galling loss of face for the senior Iraqi Arab officials who constantly pay court to Barzani in Galala without any corresponding visit by the Kurdish leader to Baghdad. The two major points which now remain to be resolved are the appointment of a Vice President and the adjudication of Kurdish majority areas by ~~the~~ the

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the census. It is ominous that Kurds here in Baghdad are already saying that Kirkuk itself is unalienably Kurdish regardless of the results of the census. As this was one of the sticking points in the discussions leading to the settlement such an attitude clearly has its explosive possibilities. We can only wait and see. It may be that the Government are intending that the census should treat each Liwa as a unit; indeed rumours that they are adjusting the boundaries in Kirkuk Liwa suggest that this may be their strategy. One factor which could well be decisive is the attitude of the Turkoman population of Kirkuk town and Liwa. The Government has attempted to offer them blandishments in the form of national cultural rights, but they may well feel that their interest lies in submerging their Turkoman nationality and calling themselves Kurds in order to ensure a Kurdish administration in the area. This indeed seems to be the assumption of many Kurds. Conversely they may feel their interests are with the Arabs, (and again the Turkomans have shown little interest in the ideal of self determination in Kurdistan), in which case there could well be serious trouble in Kirkuk after the announcement of the results of the census.

*J. H. Symons*  
(J.H. Symons)

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(e) **Development in the North** According to "the Minister of Development for the Northern areas of Iraq, Nuri Shawish [sic]", the advancement of the education and health services, transport and agriculture are the key tasks in the Government's development plans for the North and it will be necessary to spend 19,000,000 dinars to implement those plans. Besides this, special allocations of 8,400,000 dollars are planned in this year's Budget. Since the signing of the declaration on the solution of the Kurdish question, the construction of roads, 80 elementary and 20 secondary schools and 20 boarding schools has been undertaken. Measures are also being taken to enlarge the Kurdish university at Sulaymaniyah and to open faculties in other cities of the North where Kurds live. (Tanyug in English 09.50 GMT 17.6.70) 85

**ISRAEL World Bank Loan** The World Bank is providing Israel's Industrial Bank with a 25,000,000-dollar loan under a contract signed in Washington on 16th June. The money is mainly designed for buying equipment abroad, for new plants, and for the expansion of existing factories. (Israel in English 20.45 GMT 16.6.70)

**Tyre exports** Under one of the biggest export deals ever concluded by an Israeli corporation, the Alliance Tire Corporation in Hadera will be exporting I£18,000,000 worth of tyres to the USA over the next three years. (Israel in English 11.30 GMT 19.6.70)

**New Ashdod refinery** Construction of the new Ashdod refinery, which is in the planning stages, will be begun in winter 1971 and will end in late 1972. The refinery's output will be 3,000,000 tons in the initial stage. It will cost I£140,000,000. (Israel in Hebrew 17.00 GMT 21.6.70)

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**Appointment** Yaaqov Yinon has been appointed Director General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; he will replace Dr. Shmuel Cahana on 1st August. (Israel in Hebrew 17.00 GMT 21.6.70)

26 JUN

**KUWAIT East German trade representation** The East German Government has opened an official trade office in Kuwait. (ADN in German 15.49 GMT 22.6.70)

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**SUDAN Penalties for profiteering** Ahmad Sulayman, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade and acting Minister of Supply and Internal Trade, who issued a statement on 18th June on the rise in meat prices and the Government's determination to prevent profiteering, has issued a further statement warning all those in all provinces who deal in essential commodities such as meat, tea and coffee, that any contravention of the fixed prices for these commodities will render the culprit liable to imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years, plus a fine. He warned that the law on the confiscation of the property and trading licence of anyone who contravenes fixed prices "without discrimination or mercy" would be resolutely implemented, and called on citizens to report all cases of tampering with prices. (Omdurman in Arabic 11.30 GMT 21.6.70)

**Nationalisation measures** Detailed report on formation of valuation committees to assess the amounts due to nationalised banks and companies. ME/3412/A/1)

**The Khartoum-Sofia air service is to open on 18th June with a Bulgarian Airlines flight from Khartoum to Sofia and back.** (Omdurman in Arabic 11.30 GMT 17.6.70)

**SYRIA A Rumanian trade delegation led by Victor Ionescu, Chairman of the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce, had talks in Damascus with official and business circles on the expansion of trade between Rumania and Syria and on economic co-operation in connection with harbour works at Tartus, the development of the phosphate deposits at (?Kniffis), and the oil industry.** (Agerpres in English 19.42 GMT 12.6.70, 19.13 GMT 17.6.70 and 20.00 GMT 19.6.70)

**TUNISIA West German loan** In Frankfurt As'ad Bin Uthman, Secretary of State for Agriculture, has negotiated a loan of DM. 50, 800, 000 from the German Development Bank to finance the construction of the Oued Hertma dam in the Bou Salem district and the development of an irrigation area around the dam. (TAP in French 08.15 GMT 18.6.70)

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The Kurdish Question. The government appeared to be beleaguered by rumours, about and criticism of the Kurdish settlement. The threat to punish the rumour-mongers in the manner the Government had punished the "spies" showed how seriously the authorities were taking the matter. In fact, one Iraqi, described as a rumour-monger, has already been presented on Iraqi television in the same manner that the spies had been presented on television and radio to make confessions.

What these rumours were has not been disclosed --but one general criticism made was that

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Iraq

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the regime made concessions to the Kurds in order to keep itself in power. The most public criticism has come from the breakaway communist faction led by Aziz Al Haj. The faction charged that the agreement with the Kurds was made "in isolation from the people and the progressive forces."

The rumours have also been a cause of concern by Barzani and his followers --because he wants to see the regime maintain the concessions made to the Kurds. Barzani has made several statements, carried by the Kurdish AL TAAKHI and by the other Baghdad newspapers, blaming the rumours on subversive elements and appealing to all Kurds and Iraqis not to listen to them.

This state of affairs appeared to have created the need on the part of the regime to strengthen even further its relationship with Barzani. Also, the attitude of the "progressive forces" has prompted the ruling Baath Party to move to limit the projected "national front" to itself and to the Kurdish Democratic Party of Barzani.

After his meeting with Barzani earlier this month, Mr Sidam Hussein said that the Government was speeding up the implementation of the May 11th Declaration. He added that closer relationship and cooperation with the KDP will be established.

The KDP is due to hold its congress either at the end of this month or early next month to, among other things, nominate the Kurdish Vice President. This will be the first KDP congress since the Kurdish settlement was reached in May.

On the other hand, there has been no mention yet of setting the specific date for the census that is due to be undertaken of all the Iraqi population. Statements by Iraqi leaders earlier said that the census is expected next fall --and UN technicians are to help in carrying it out. The idea of the census is to determine the size of the Kurdish population, its proportion to the over-all Iraqi population and to determine the concentrations of the Kurds in the northern areas. This is important for deciding the specific geographical regions where the Kurdish population forms a majority --because it will be there that the Kurds will exercise autonomy as provided for under the March 11th Declaration.

Organizational Level. That the meeting of the Ministers a few days ago was headed by Mr Sidam Hussein showed again that he is the second executive after President Al Bakr. The constitutional amendments late last year, made the President automatically a Prime Minister. As Vice Chairman of the RCC, Takriti is the effectual executive Vice President, and now the effectual Vice Premier, although on paper the title of Vice Premier had been cancelled in the constitutional amendments.

This makes him senior to the two Vice Presidents, Saleh Mahdi Ammash and Hardan Abdel Ghafar Takriti, whose functions as Vice Presidents appear now to be more ceremonial and a formality than anything else. They have recently been carrying out missions delegated to them by President Al Bakr. They, however, remain important in the regime by virtue of their membership in the RCC, which is the highest executive authority in Iraq now.

The meeting of the district governors appeared to have been aimed to discuss the problems of the various districts and to try to find solutions to them. Emphasized at these meetings, according to RADIO BAGHDAD, were educational problems. The Government has been working hard to bring the schools and other educational institutions in the northern areas back to normal after several years of disruption because of the Kurdish war.



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NEQ 1/2

1 July, 1970

The Kurdish Problem

I should have acknowledged your very interesting letter 1/4 of 13 June before. It has been circulating widely and has only just found its way back to me.

2. We have also got the impression here that negotiations have been running into difficulty and that the Iraqis will have their work cut out if they are to produce a substantive progress report in time for the two main revolutionary celebrations later this month.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

*PHM*

J. H. Symons, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

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Problem Of Kurds In Iraq. Problem Of Kurds In Iraq. 21 Mar. 1970. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1237. Newspaper Cutting And Map. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107509747/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=31deb1b1&pg=1](http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107509747/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=31deb1b1&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.